Hezbollah's Disarmament: Implications and Implementation Problems
The issue of Hezbollah's disarmament is one of the most complex structural issues in the Lebanese and regional landscape. It cannot be reduced to its security dimension related to state sovereignty and its monopoly over the use of armed force. Rather, it extends beyond that to touch upon the core sectarian, political, and economic balances upon which the Lebanese system is based. It is also intrinsically linked to broader regional and international interactions. Recently, this issue has entered an unprecedented and critical phase, as a result of the convergence of two significant strategic variables: First, the profound repercussions of the recent war with Israel in late 2024, which inflicted tangible military losses on the party and retested its ability to continue as a regional deterrent force; and second, the dramatic collapse of the Syrian regime, which for decades represented Hezbollah's strategic depth and the lifeline of its logistical and military support.
In addition, the international factor is emerging through intensifying pressure on the Lebanese government, which has taken a historic step by tasking the military establishment with preparing a practical disarmament plan. This development presents the country with a difficult test of its internal and external balance of power. Therefore, this problem cannot be approached purely from a security perspective. Rather, it requires an in-depth reading of the intertwined set of structural, political, sectarian, economic, and social factors that constitute obstacles to implementation. This opens the door to anticipating multiple scenarios for the future of this issue in light of the transformations witnessed in the region during the current year.
First - Conflicting Historical Roots and Legitimacy
The Party's Transformation into a Parallel State
The fundamental problem with Hezbollah's disarmament lies in the nature of the party itself, which has evolved since its inception in 1982 as a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon into something resembling a "parallel state" or even a "deep state" within the Lebanese state. The party has succeeded in establishing its popular and national legitimacy, particularly after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, which consolidated its position as a resistance force. However, the party's trajectory did not stop at its military boundaries; rather, it expanded to encompass an integrated system of political, economic, and social influence, making it a comprehensive actor that transcends the purely military framework.
The party relies on a tight organizational structure, including the "Jihad Council," responsible for its military activities, and the "Political Council," which manages its internal and external affairs. This is in addition to a wide network of social and economic institutions. Prominent among these institutions is the "Al-Qard Al-Hassan Foundation," which provides interest-free soft loans, and the "Bayt Al-Mal," which represents the party's financial and investment arm. This interconnected network has made disarmament a more complex issue than simply confiscating military equipment; it is an existential challenge that affects the entire structure of an integrated parallel entity. This largely explains the failure of all previous initiatives that attempted to address the issue solely from its military perspective.
Legal Legitimacy vs. National Legitimacy
The crisis is further complicated by the stark contradiction between the international legal foundations and the internal national legitimacy of the party's weapons. From an international legal perspective, Security Council resolutions—particularly Resolution 1559 (2004) and Resolution 1701 (2006)—require the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and the extension of the authority of the Lebanese state over all its territory. However, the internal Lebanese situation took a different course, as national legitimacy granted the party continued political cover.
After the 1989 Taif Agreement, which stipulated the dissolution of the militias that participated in the civil war, the weapons of the "resistance" were exempted from confiscation, under the pretext of the continued Israeli threat. Over the following decades, successive Lebanese governments reinforced this equation by adopting the phrase "army, people, and resistance" in their ministerial statements, giving a quasi-official character to the existence of the party's weapons, despite its lack of subordination to the legitimate authority of the state.
The Vicious Circle between Lebanese and Israeli Positions
This contradiction has led to a vicious cycle of political and security stalemate. Each party interprets international resolutions to serve its own interests: Hezbollah supporters believe that Resolution 1701 has not been fully implemented by Israel, particularly with regard to a complete withdrawal and cessation of violations, thus maintaining the justification for the "resistance." In contrast, Israel stipulates that any withdrawal or negotiation be directly linked to Hezbollah's disarmament, and considers the weapons themselves the greatest threat to its national security.
This conditional exchange of positions has made each side "hostage" to the other, such that no progress can be made without mutual concessions, which have not yet been achieved. As a result, the arms issue has transformed from a sovereign Lebanese matter into a tool in a broader regional conflict, in which Lebanon is used more as an arena for settling scores than as a venue for an independent internal solution.
Second: Contexts and Dynamics of the Decision to Disarm Hezbollah
Repercussions of the Recent War with Israel
The military confrontation with Israel in late 2024 marked a sharp turn in Hezbollah's situation, with the party suffering losses described as the most devastating since its founding in 1982. Western intelligence reports indicated that the party lost more than half of its stockpile of medium and heavy weapons, including long-range precision missiles that it relied on to deter Israel, in addition to the killing or wounding of thousands of its elite special forces fighters. A wide range of strategic infrastructure was also destroyed, including command and control centers, a network of fortified tunnels in the south and the Bekaa, and major missile storage depots.
In response to these losses, Israel adopted a "systematic attrition" approach during the war, rather than engaging in a comprehensive escalation or a large-scale ground occupation. It focused its operations on precisely targeting the party's military infrastructure, while avoiding slipping into open warfare that would allow the party to regain its role as a "resistance force." Thus, Israel reshaped the rules of engagement: from a mutual war of attrition to a war of strategic undermining targeting the party's ability to command and control in the foreseeable future.
The direct result of this confrontation was an unprecedented weakening of the party's military structure, sparking internal and external debate about whether this weakness represented a historic opportunity to reassert Lebanese state sovereignty and disarm the party, or merely a passing phase in its long conflict with Israel.
The Fall of the Assad Regime in Syria
This variable is no less important than the first, and may even surpass it in strategic impact. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syria has become Hezbollah's strategic depth, serving as a vital conduit for Iranian arms shipments, a military training arena, and a rear area enabling the party to expand regionally. With the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, the party, along with Iran, lost the most important pillars of geopolitical support they had relied on for decades.
The matter did not stop with the fall of the regime alone; rather, the new Syrian position, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, was decisive in nature. In his speech on August 24, 2025, Sharaa declared that "Syria has overcome the wounds caused by Hezbollah," emphasizing that his country would no longer deal with any "armed parties or militias," but only with the "legitimate Lebanese government." With this announcement, the curtain fell on a long phase of the Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah strategic alliance, and Hezbollah found itself facing unprecedented logistical challenges regarding arms transfers and financing.
This radical shift represented a "decisive blow" not only to Hezbollah, but also to Iran, which lost one of its most important regional bridges for projecting its influence in the Levant. Thus, Hezbollah faced a strategic vacuum that would be difficult to fill quickly, especially in light of the increasing Western and international pressure on alternative supply lines.
Convergence of factors: Opportunity for the state or a gateway to new dangers?
The convergence of these two factors—military weakness due to the war and the loss of strategic depth with the fall of the Syrian regime—gave the Lebanese government an unprecedented opportunity to make a historic decision by tasking the army with preparing a practical disarmament plan. This development shifts the issue from the realm of political and diplomatic maneuvering to the level of practical implementation.
However, this historic opportunity entails a very dangerous paradox: Hezbollah's weakness does not necessarily mean its willingness to accept a settlement. On the contrary, its sense of existential threat may push it to become more rigid and refuse any concessions, fearing appearing weak before its domestic bases and regional allies. Furthermore, Iran, which considers Hezbollah its most prominent arm in the Eastern Mediterranean, will strive to restore its capabilities, albeit through unconventional channels, which could prolong the crisis.
Hence, the new geopolitical pressure, while presenting an opportunity to reassert state sovereignty, could also lead to more escalatory scenarios if Hezbollah decides to bide its time and wait for regional developments to shift in its favor. This paradox places Lebanon before a highly complex equation: either seize this historic moment to launch a disarmament process, or slide into an open confrontation that could thwart any chance of stability.
US Pressure: Aid Conditioned on Sovereignty
The United States plays the most influential role in this shift, linking any financial or military support to Lebanon to tangible progress on the issue of illegal weapons. Diplomatic sources revealed that Washington has prepared an economic and military aid package that could exceed $1 billion, but it is conditional on the Lebanese government's commitment to its disarmament plan. American press reports also indicated that the Trump administration views the current moment as a "historic opportunity" to rebuild the Lebanese state, given Hezbollah's declining military capabilities and its loss of strategic depth in Syria.
US pressure on the Lebanese government has also intensified since the signing of the ceasefire agreement in November 2024, with recent weeks witnessing repeated visits by US envoys to Beirut. This US move is part of a broader strategy to reshape the geopolitical map of the Middle East and reduce Iranian influence in the region by weakening its military proxies.
A Conditional Israeli Barter
In parallel with US pressure, Israel has expressed willingness to reduce its military presence at the southern border points. This was reflected in a statement by the Israeli Defense Minister on August 26, 2025, stating that "a gradual withdrawal from some border positions is possible, provided it is accompanied by serious Lebanese action to control weapons." These statements demonstrate Israel's willingness to respond to the Lebanese government's initiatives, but they require tangible security guarantees. This places the issue of disarmament at the heart of a complex trade-off between the Israeli withdrawal and the Lebanese government's demonstration of its seriousness.
An Economic Opportunity Conditioned on Stability
On the Arab level, the Gulf states—led by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar—are willing to provide extensive financial support to Lebanon if the government proves its seriousness in restoring sovereign decision-making. Media reports revealed on August 25 that an unannounced Gulf meeting in Riyadh discussed ways to support Lebanon financially, but only if the government succeeds in presenting a clear plan for disarmament and restoring the role of the army. This support is seen as an additional incentive for Lebanon, which is mired in a stifling economic crisis, with inflation reaching record levels exceeding 200% in July 2025.
Final Extension of UNIFIL
At the international level, the Security Council adopted a resolution on August 27, 2025, described as "selective," extending UNIFIL's mandate for the final time. A gradual transition process is expected to begin, with responsibility for the south handed over to the Lebanese Army by the end of 2026. This decision reflects the international community's impatience with the continued stalemate and its desire to resolve the southern issue within a comprehensive settlement that guarantees the Lebanese state's full control over its territory.
Hezbollah and Iran's Position
Hezbollah, on the other hand, has responded to these developments with a sharply negative stance, describing any attempt to disarm it as "a direct service to the Israeli project." In a speech on August 28, the party's Secretary-General affirmed that "the resistance will remain and will not surrender its weapons under any circumstances," warning that "any attack on the resistance's weapons will be considered an attack on all of Lebanon." This stance coincided with statements by Iranian officials, including the Iranian Foreign Minister, that Tehran "will not allow any steps that would undermine its direct influence in the Levant." These positions clearly highlight the continuing regional dimension of the crisis and demonstrate that any internal Lebanese action will remain dependent on the reactions of Tehran and Hezbollah.
Overall, the convergence of these international and regional realities creates an exceptional circumstance that can be viewed from two perspectives:
• A historic opportunity for Lebanon to rebuild its state on the basis of genuine sovereignty, if the government succeeds in leveraging international and Arab support for a comprehensive national project.
• The risk of escalation if Hezbollah and Iran insist on rejecting any settlement, which could lead to a direct confrontation or the collapse of the Lebanese plan before it sees the light of day.
Between these two paths, Lebanon faces a complex equation: Will it be able to seize the opportunity to launch a realistic process toward disarmament, or will the issue become an additional card in the game of regional balances, returning the crisis to square one.
Third: Internal Obstacles to Implementing the Resolution
Lack of Political Consensus and Sectarian Division
Political and sectarian divisions constitute one of the most prominent obstacles to any attempt to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese political scene remains deeply divided. On the one hand, a broad spectrum of political forces (such as the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb Party, and their allies) believes that the party's weapons have become a tool of regional conflict, subservient to the Iranian agenda more than serving the national interest. On the other hand, other forces, most notably the Amal Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement, believe that the party's weapons remain a fundamental element in the national defense equation, and that disarming them under the current circumstances would leave Lebanon exposed to Israel.
This division goes beyond being a political dispute to being part of the sectarian structure of the Lebanese system, where Hezbollah and its allies almost completely control Shiite representation in parliament and the government, giving it the power to obstruct any decision affecting its weapons. This was clearly demonstrated when the party described the government's recent decision as a "great sin," declaring its absolute refusal to deal with it. This suggests that any official effort to disarm will encounter a solid internal political wall.
Weak State Institutions:
The second challenge lies in the weakness of Lebanon's official institutions, most notably the Lebanese Army, which is supposed to be the body responsible for implementing the disarmament plan.
According to the 2025 Global Firepower ranking, the Lebanese Army ranked 115th globally, with extremely limited capabilities (116 tanks, 11 rocket launchers, and a limited number of warplanes). The army relies almost entirely on external support (American, French, and, to a lesser extent, Gulf). In early August 2025, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called for a long-term international support plan worth $1 billion annually over ten years, to rebuild the army's capabilities and modernize its armament.
Compared to these capabilities, Hezbollah possesses an unconventional military arsenal, estimated at between 120,000 and 150,000 missiles, in addition to accumulated field experience from its wars in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. This structural imbalance of power makes any direct confrontation between the army and the party fraught with the risk of sliding into a new civil war.
The Service Void and the Party's Social Legitimacy
In addition to its military strength, Hezbollah enjoys solid social legitimacy, derived from its role as an alternative provider of basic services through its institutions, such as the Al-Qard Al-Hassan Foundation and the Islamic Health Authority. The party provides concessionary loans, medical and educational services, and extensive social welfare to its community.
Furthermore, in light of the severe economic crisis Lebanon is experiencing (with inflation reaching over 200% in mid-2025 and the value of the lira falling to record lows), the importance of this network has increased, as it constitutes a social safety net for a broad segment of the population, particularly within the Shiite community.
This reality makes the disarmament process not simply a matter of "confiscating equipment," but rather the dismantling of an integrated quasi-state structure. The Lebanese state requires effective alternatives to fill the security and service vacuum that the party's decline may leave. To date, the Lebanese state has not demonstrated the ability to play this role, which further complicates the implementation of disarmament.
Hence, it can be said that the Lebanese government's decision to task the army with preparing a disarmament plan presents it with a double dilemma: the option of implementing it by force could lead to an armed clash with Hezbollah, which could quickly escalate into a new civil war, especially given the sharp sectarian divide. The option of inaction and failure to implement it would expose the state's weakness and lead to a loss of credibility with the international community, which could result in the cessation of financial and military support to Lebanon at a time when it most needs it. This dilemma places Lebanon in a critical position, as the state appears captive to its impossible options; it is unable to impose its sovereignty by force, and unable to retreat without paying a heavy political and economic price.
Fourth - Disarmament and the Possibilities of Normalization
A crucial strategic dimension lies in the link between the disarmament issue and the possibilities of normalization with Israel. In American and Israeli calculations, it is impossible to discuss any path to normalization with Lebanon without the presence of an armed force outside the state that raises the banner of resistance. Hezbollah's disarmament thus becomes a necessary condition for opening the door to security and perhaps economic understandings between Beirut and Tel Aviv. Some recent indicators, such as Israel's willingness to link a reduction in its strikes to Lebanese steps on the ground, suggest an unspoken trade-off: The more Lebanon advances on the arms issue, the greater the likelihood of embarking on a gradual normalization process, beginning with technical steps such as cooperation on offshore gas and possibly ending with a political agreement.
But this path faces major obstacles. Internally, the Lebanese street remains deeply divided over normalization, with a large segment rejecting it for nationalist and historical reasons. Regionally, Iran and its allies would view any Lebanese approach to normalization as a betrayal of the axis of resistance and a direct strategic blow to them. Therefore, linking disarmament to normalization could make the issue more sensitive rather than facilitating its resolution, transforming it from an issue of internal sovereignty into a card in a broader Arab-Iranian conflict.
Fifth: Future Scenarios: Opportunities and Risks
Based on these facts, three main scenarios can be envisioned for the outcome of the Lebanese plan until the end of 2025 and beyond:
1. The Gradual Diplomatic Scenario: This approach, led by the United States through initiatives such as "Step by Step," relies on persuasion and the provision of tangible economic and social incentives (reconstruction of the south, job creation) in exchange for concessions from Hezbollah. The plan also includes a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories. US envoy Tom Barrack proposed "selective disarmament" and a distinction between Hezbollah's military and political wings in an attempt to open the door to negotiations. However, this approach was rejected by the US State Department and Israel, which does not distinguish between its wings and considers it a unified terrorist organization.
2. The Stalemate and Procrastination Scenario: This scenario is the most likely in the short term, as Hezbollah will continue to exert its political influence to obstruct any real progress on the disarmament issue, using arguments of state weakness and Israel's failure to fulfill its obligations. This could recreate the "balance of fragility" that Lebanon has witnessed over the past two decades, with neither war nor settlement.
3. The explosive scenario: This is the least likely but most dangerous scenario, and it represents the state entering into a military confrontation with Hezbollah with external support. This scenario would be extremely costly for Lebanon, threatening the outbreak of a new civil war and the collapse of state institutions. However, it remains a last resort if international parties insist on imposing a solution by force.
Finally, the issue of disarmament has transformed from a state of continuous stagnation to a race against time. Regional variables are pushing toward a solution, and the Security Council's decision to extend UNIFIL's mandate for the "final time" until the end of 2026 sets a time limit for the permanent stalemate. This forces all parties to approach the issue with unprecedented seriousness. In this context, the actors face a trade-off between solutions. The new diplomatic approach, despite its complexity, is considered more effective because it targets the social and economic dimensions that form the basis of Hezbollah's power. In contrast, military solutions may seem "easier" given the stalemate, but they pose disastrous risks for Lebanon and the region.