The "Snapback" Trigger Mechanism and Iran's Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Iranian nuclear case poses one of the most complex legal and political issues in the contemporary international system. The legal dimension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) intersects with the procedural and political dimensions of Security Council Resolution 2231 and the "snapback" mechanism. On the one hand, the European Troika (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) seeks to activate this mechanism based on their rights as participating parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). On the other hand, Iran argues that this step lacks legitimacy due to the Europeans' failure to fulfill their obligations, thus emptying the concept of "participation in good faith" of its meaning. The situation becomes more complex with the possibility of Iran's withdrawal from the NPT and its legal and procedural implications. This poses a difficult test for the international system regarding its ability to deal with the renewed challenges of nuclear proliferation.
First: The Legal Framework for the European Troika's Activation of the Snapback Mechanism
The activation of the snapback mechanism by the European Troika (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) is based on Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This resolution, issued pursuant to Article 41 of the UN Charter, established a specific legal framework stipulating that if any participating state notifies the Security Council of a situation of "significant non-compliance," the Council must vote within thirty days on a draft resolution maintaining the lifting of sanctions. If this decision is not taken within the time limit, the sanctions stipulated in previous Council resolutions will automatically be reimposed and will be enforced against Iran.
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are considered "participating states" by virtue of being parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Therefore, any of them has the right to initiate the mechanism by notifying the Security Council without the consent of the other parties. This right is derived directly from the wording of Resolution 2231, which linked the activation of the automatic snapback of sanctions to the mere receipt of notification and the failure to adopt a resolution extending the lifting of sanctions.
Procedurally, Paragraph (36) of the JCPOA stipulates a specific dispute resolution process, beginning with an attempt to address the issue within the framework of the agreement itself. If the complaining party considers the non-compliance to be "serious" and the issue is not resolved through internal channels, it has the right to refer the matter to the Security Council, which will then initiate the process linked to the binding Resolution 2231. The European Troika previously resorted to activating this dispute resolution mechanism in 2020, as a prelude to taking subsequent steps.
Iran objects to this approach and argues that Its legitimacy or the exhaustion of the dispute mechanism in advance, but the prevailing international legal interpretation is that the right to activate exists whenever a participating state believes there is substantial non-compliance, and that its automatic effect is the return of sanctions within thirty days unless the Council adopts a resolution maintaining their relaxation.
Second: The Iranian argument regarding the illegitimacy of the European activation of the snapback mechanism
Iran believes that the European Troika's move is illegitimate because it was taken by parties that have not fulfilled their obligations under the nuclear agreement, particularly regarding the lifting of restrictions on "Transition Day" (October 18, 2023). According to the Iranian argument, the Europeans' maintenance of sanctions and restrictive measures after this date constitutes a fundamental breach of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and those who have violated it are not entitled to activate an enforcement mechanism against the aggrieved party.
Based on this, Tehran argues that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have effectively lost their status as "participating states," or at least as "participants in good faith," a status essential to the procedural eligibility required to activate the snapback mechanism. Therefore, the absence of this characteristic or its distortion due to bad faith leads—according to Iranian logic—to the forfeit of the right of the European Troika (E3) to notify the Security Council of a case of "substantial non-compliance."
Iran adds that the dispute resolution process stipulated in Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA was activated and exhausted between 2018 and 2020, and that the Europeans did not implement the corresponding pledges during that period. Therefore, the return today to the use of the "snapback" notification constitutes—in Iran's view—an abuse of procedures after the exhaustion of the agreement's internal process.
Tehran also relies on the "unclean hands" principle and the logic of reciprocity stipulated in the agreement itself. It considers the nuclear steps it has undertaken since 2019 not to be a breach, but rather legitimate "compensatory measures" according to Paragraphs 26 and 36, which came in response to the United States' withdrawal and the European countries' failure to provide the economic benefits resulting from the lifting of sanctions. Accordingly, Iran believes that a party in breach of its obligations should not benefit from the automatic sanctions mechanism against the affected party.
Finally, Iran criticizes the timing of the snapback just prior to the Termination Day of Resolution 2231 (October 18, 2025), believing that it empties the intended timetable of its content and circumvents the goal of gradually phasing out restrictions, as the sanctions are automatically restored at the last minute rather than being terminated.
Third - Legal and Procedural Controls for Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The rule governing withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is contained in Article 10/1, which allows each State Party, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to withdraw if it determines that exceptional events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It must notify all parties and the Security Council three months in advance, and the notification must include a statement of these events that it considers grounds for withdrawal. The purpose of the three-month period is to allow space Diplomatic and legal measures to address potential repercussions for international peace and security.
Procedurally, notifications are sent to the three "depositary governments" (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia) for dissemination to all parties and to the Security Council. Withdrawal only changes the nature of obligations from the date of its entry into force. According to the law of treaties (the 1969 Vienna Convention), withdrawal releases a state from future obligations, but does not remove any responsibility for violations committed prior to the date of its entry into force, nor does it diminish rights or legal positions already established.
With regard to IAEA safeguards, Article III of the Treaty requires non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement based on the model document INFCIRC/153. These agreements are linked to a state's membership in the NPT and therefore, in principle, terminate upon the entry into force of withdrawal, with the possibility of continuing any other independent safeguards arrangements (such as facility agreements under INFCIRC/66), if they exist.
International practice shows that notification of withdrawal may be The Security Council or the international community reacted. The most prominent case is North Korea, which the Council called on in 1993 to reverse its withdrawal and fulfill its obligations. This illustrates the intended role of the notification period as a window to consider the implications of withdrawal for regional and international security.
Finally, treaty law allows the state making the withdrawal decision to withdraw to rescind it before it enters into force, i.e., within the three-month period. This gives it room for political and legal review before the withdrawal is fully legally effective. These controls define the framework for legitimate withdrawal from a treaty without compromising its substance or purposes.
Fourth: The legal and procedural path for Iran's withdrawal from the NPT
The rule stems from the text of the treaty itself. Article 10/1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) grants any state party the right to withdraw if it decides, in exercise of its sovereignty, that "exceptional events related to the subject matter of the Treaty" have jeopardized its "supreme interests." Written notification must be given to all parties and to the Security Council three months in advance, including a description of these events. Withdrawal does not require anyone's consent and becomes effective upon expiry of the deadline.
Procedurally at the international level, the notification is sent to the three "depositary governments" (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia) for dissemination to the parties, and the Security Council is notified in parallel. The three-month deadline is designed to allow the Council to consider the potential repercussions for peace and security, and this window has been used in well-known precedents, such as the case of North Korea.
Procedurally, at the constitutional level within Iran, a decision of this magnitude passes through the relevant institutions: the Supreme National Security Council sets the framework and policy, the government participates in referral and implementation, and requires the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) pursuant to Article 77, the signature of the President pursuant to Article 125, and scrutiny by the Guardian Council. The Supreme Council's decisions become effective after the Leader's ratification pursuant to Article 176.
Regarding safeguards, Iran is subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153) (published as INFCIRC/214 for Iran) linked to its membership in the NPT, which, in principle, ends upon the withdrawal. The Additional Protocol, which grants the IAEA broader powers for unannounced inspections and access to additional sites, was signed by Iran in 2003 and provisionally implemented. However, it has not been formally ratified, and therefore is not effective in Iran. Its implementation has previously been suspended, while any independent safeguards arrangements (such as facility agreements under INFCIRC/66) may continue, if they exist.
From the perspective of treaty law, withdrawal releases a state from future obligations as of the date of its entry into force. However, it does not eliminate responsibility for past violations, nor does it affect rights or legal positions that arose prior to that date. Within the three-month period, a state may review its decision and withdraw the notification before it takes effect.
Fifth: Comparison between the cases of Iraq and North Korea and their implications for Iran
The Iraqi experience in 1990–1991 was a collective enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Following the invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council imposed a comprehensive economic sanctions regime in Resolution 661 (1990), and then linked their lifting to the conditions of a ceasefire and the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction in Resolution 687 (1991). The sanctions were not isolated, but rather part of a legal "engineering" to compel Iraq to disarm and cooperate with international inspections.
This entailed a more in-depth inspection and monitoring framework; subsequent resolutions such as 707 and 715 (1991) established verification and monitoring systems (UNSCOM/IAEA) with broad and ongoing powers. Thus, the situation in Iraq revolved around enforcement measures dictated by the Security Council, with direct and escalating UN oversight until compliance was demonstrated.
In contrast, North Korea's case stemmed from a unilateral "treaty right" under Article 10/1 of the NPT, which allows withdrawal with three months' prior notice indicating justified "extraordinary events." Pyongyang announced its intention to withdraw in 1993, and the Security Council urged it to reverse course, but it resumed withdrawal in 2003. Later, after nuclear tests, the Security Council intervened with sanctions resolutions (beginning with Resolution 1718 in 2006). Here, the process began as a withdrawal from the treaty and then turned into a coercive international process due to a threat to peace and security.
For Iran, the situation takes on a hybrid character that distinguishes it from the cases of Iraq and North Korea. It remains a member of the NPT and is subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/214). At the same time, its status is linked to Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and established the "snapback" mechanism, which leads to the resumption of nuclear activities. Previous sanctions resolutions are automatically enforced if the Council is informed of "substantial non-compliance" and no resolution extending sanctions relief is issued within thirty days. Thus, the instrument is of a UN character based on a Security Council resolution, but its procedural activation is linked to the terms of a contractual agreement between the parties.
From a safeguards perspective, Iraq was subject to mandatory inspections designed by the Security Council itself as part of the terms of the ceasefire. As for North Korea, the termination of its membership in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) essentially ended its comprehensive safeguards agreement before it moved to Chapter VII sanctions. Iran, by contrast, remains under IAEA safeguards by virtue of its remaining a party to the treaty, which provides the international community with existing monitoring and legal tools without requiring withdrawal from the NPT.
Thus, it can be argued that the 1991 Iraq sanctions were direct coercive enforcement of a UN disarmament and monitoring regime; North Korea's withdrawal was an exercise of a treaty right followed by subsequent UN sanctions; As for Iran, it is not on a path to exiting the treaty, but rather facing a snapback mechanism enshrined in an international resolution, with the safeguards system continuing, which produces a legal and procedural framework different from both Iraq and North Korea.
Sixth: Legal Responsibility between Iran and the West: Mutual Obligations and Reciprocal Violations
The issue of international responsibility in the case of Iran raises a complex problem. It relates not only to Iran's behavior within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but also extends to the responsibility of other parties, primarily the European Troika and the United States, which played a direct role in undermining the mutual obligations within the nuclear agreement.
With regard to Iran, if it remains within the treaty, it remains subject to clear obligations related to not seeking to possess or develop a nuclear weapon and accepting IAEA oversight. Therefore, any breach of these obligations could amount to a violation, entailing international responsibility that would require intervention by the international community through sanctions or countermeasures. If it decides to withdraw from the treaty, the matter becomes more complicated. Article 10 of the NPT allows this right, provided that it submits prior notification to the Security Council and the IAEA, stating "exceptional reasons" that threaten the supreme interests of the state. Thus, the withdrawal itself is not illegal. However, the behavior that may result from it—such as exploiting the withdrawal as a cover to develop a nuclear weapons program—may constitute a basis for holding Iran responsible for threatening international peace and security.
On the part of the European Troika and the United States, Iran argues that the other party is the one that violated its obligations first, starting with the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and continuing with the European parties' failure to fulfill their economic promises. If this claim is true, Iran may find this a legal justification for taking countermeasures, which may go as far as threatening to withdraw from the treaty itself. This logic is based on well-established principles of international law, such as the principle of reciprocity, or the "existence of cause" rule, which allows a state to absolve itself of its obligations if the other party fails to meet its basic commitments.
In light of this, a delicate legal dilemma arises: Can Iran invoke the violations of others to justify its withdrawal from the NPT, or are the treaty's obligations considered independent obligations that lapse only according to its formal procedures? This question demonstrates that international responsibility in the Iranian case is not unilateral, but rather mutual and overlapping. It is divided between Iran, which may be accused of using the withdrawal as a means to acquire prohibited military capabilities, and the West, which is accused of undermining the foundations of the nuclear agreement and undermining the contractual framework that was supposed to govern the behavior of both parties.
Seventh: The Future of the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime in Light of the Iranian Case
The international nuclear non-proliferation regime, primarily represented by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), has been considered one of the cornerstones of collective security since its entry into force in 1970. Despite the challenges it has faced over the past decades, it has remained the most comprehensive framework for regulating relations between nuclear-weapon states and those without, and for preventing the expansion of the nuclear club globally. However, the case of Iran and the possibility of its withdrawal from the treaty raises profound questions about the ability of this regime to withstand accelerating geopolitical changes.
If Iran formally withdraws, this could open the door to reconsidering the commitments of several other states that are concerned about the security environment surrounding them. An Iranian withdrawal, if accompanied by the continuation of an advanced nuclear program, could encourage regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or even Egypt to consider similar options, whether by developing independent nuclear capabilities or by seeking alternative security arrangements. Thus, an Iranian withdrawal would set a precedent that could undermine the voluntary compliance basis upon which the non-proliferation regime is based.
Furthermore, an Iranian withdrawal could undermine confidence in the treaty's ability to meet the interests of member states, as it is perceived as imposing strict obligations on non-nuclear-weapon states, while granting the five nuclear-weapon states permanent privileges without serious steps toward disarmament. In this context, talk of "double standards" within the international system becomes more acute, reinforcing the rhetoric calling for reform or even rewriting non-proliferation rules.
However, Iran's withdrawal may have the opposite effect of pushing the international community, particularly the major powers, to strengthen the non-proliferation regime rather than allowing it to erode. The United States and Europe, along with Russia and China, are expected to reaffirm the centrality of the NPT and perhaps consider additional mechanisms to restrict withdrawal or impose automatic sanctions on withdrawing states. This could lead to a new development in international law: restricting the "right to withdraw" as a direct threat to international peace and security.
Ultimately, the future of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime will largely depend on how the international community manages the Iranian situation. If it deals with it flexibly or laxly, it may encourage more states to challenge the existing order. However, if it is dealt with legally and diplomatically rigorously, the threat may turn into an opportunity to renew the treaty's legitimacy and enhance its effectiveness. Iran thus remains a true test of the resilience of the international system, which has endured for more than half a century in the face of the temptations of nuclear weapons and the pressures of major power competition.
In conclusion, The Iranian case reveals that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is at a historic turning point, where the challenge is no longer limited to the compliance of a single state, but rather relates to the treaty's ability and its mechanisms to withstand accelerating geopolitical changes. If Iran decides to withdraw from the treaty or pursue an advanced nuclear program, this could trigger a chain of security reactions in the Middle East, prompting countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt to review their nuclear options. In this case, we could witness the region transforming into one of the world's most threatening hotspots for the international non-proliferation regime.
Conversely, the international community may exploit this crisis to rethink the loopholes in the existing regime, whether by restricting the right to withdraw, establishing more binding enforcement mechanisms, or even rebalancing the obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear states. In this sense, the Iranian case is not merely a passing crisis; rather, it could become a catalyst for reshaping the rules of international nuclear law to suit the realities of the twenty-first century.
Therefore, the future of the NPT will be determined not only by what Tehran decides, but also by what the major powers and the international community decide: either to allow the regime to gradually weaken under pressure, or to turn the crisis into an opportunity to rebuild it on more just and solid foundations.