A Soft Strategic Environment: Israeli Trends in Southern Syria – A Reading of Paths and Mechanisms
The fall of the Syrian Ba'ath Party regime last December was not just another episode in a series of collapses of traditional regimes witnessed in the Middle East in recent years. Rather, this event opened the door to reshaping the regional landscape and unleashing Israeli expansion into areas that have long held special geostrategic importance in the Israeli strategic mindset. As soon as the regime's fall was announced and its leader, Bashar al-Assad, fled to Moscow, the Israeli military launched a series of continuous military operations, including airstrikes and incursions that resulted in the destruction of hundreds of Syrian military sites. The Israeli army quickly crossed the border line with Syria, established by the United Nations in 1974 as part of the disengagement agreement, whose collapse was announced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the same day the regime fell. More importantly, it created a new reality in southern Syria, against the backdrop of the complex security, social, and political crisis in the region, whose population is predominantly Druze.
First: Israel's Objectives in Southern Syria
First: Strengthening geostrategic superiority: The Israeli occupation and its incursion into Syrian territory (beyond the occupied Golan Heights) have given Israel control over strategic high points in the region, enabling it to expand its intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities within both Syria and Lebanon. Control of Mount Hermon also provides Israel with an effective surveillance capability covering the entire southeastern part of Lebanon, giving Israel intelligence and geographic superiority.
Within this framework, Israel seeks to establish a buffer zone in southern Syria to mitigate potential security threats, particularly from Iran, Hezbollah, and other factions operating in the region. Despite the decline of Iran's direct military presence in the region, Israel remains concerned about the continued logistical support networks and intelligence infrastructure of these forces, viewing them as a long-term security threat. However, these measures could escalate security tensions in southern Syria.
Second. Enhancing Water Security: Following its intervention in the post-Assad era, Israel now directly or indirectly controls most of the areas rich in surface water resources in Quneitra and western Daraa, including more than a dozen dams in Quneitra and Daraa.
Third. Enhancing Soft Power: In addition, Israel views community outreach efforts in the south as a means of asserting its security control over the region, enhancing its soft power in the region and facilitating bottom-up normalization. Most of these efforts so far have focused on Quneitra, which has been largely demilitarized in recent months. In general, the above enables Israel to reshape its rules of engagement, giving it greater operational flexibility to carry out preemptive strikes against military targets without resorting to large-scale ground operations in the long term.
Second: Military Deployment Trends
While the border strip in Quneitra and the southern governorates can be considered a concentrated area of Israeli presence, several areas in Syria have become part of an active theater of operations that contributes to defining Israeli strategic interests in the country. It has become possible to effectively divide Israel's field presence and extensive interventions in Syria since the fall of Assad into four zones, each with its own military and security circumstances and motivations:
1- The Active Deployment Zone
The active deployment zone follows the boundaries of the former demilitarized border strip in Quneitra, extending from the Syrian-Lebanese border in the north to the Yarmouk Basin in the south. This area serves as an Israeli foothold within Syrian territory itself (unlike the occupied Syrian Golan Heights), and is used as a launching pad for large-scale military incursions and operations. To secure this area, Israeli forces have conducted sweeping sweeps and demilitarization operations in cities, towns, and villages along the border strip. Therefore, Israeli forces are expected to expand this area to include (and occupy) the entire Quneitra Governorate, parts of the Damascus countryside, and western Daraa in the coming period, in yet another flagrant violation of Syrian sovereignty and international law.
This area also serves as a relatively safe environment for troop movement and a suitable environment for "soft power" interventions aimed at building relationships between Israeli forces and the local population in the south. In recent months, Israel has worked to establish its community presence in the area, delivering approximately five shipments of relief baskets (containing food and medical supplies) to the villages of Abu Tina, al-Asha, Breqiya, al-Rafid, and Sa'ida al-Golan between March 10 and May 12. It is estimated that hundreds of aid operations have been carried out since the fall of the Syrian regime last December. Although these efforts were initially met with resistance from the local population, with several cases of aid chains being rejected or destroyed, the population has subsequently become more receptive to the aid. This may be due to the historical economic marginalization of Quneitra under Assad, as well as the economic collapse following the fall of the regime.
2- The Area of Incursions
It is estimated that Israeli forces have carried out at least 130 ground incursions since late last year. However, this number increases significantly when other types of operations are taken into account, such as road closures (76 cases), the destruction of military equipment (13), the establishment of military positions (12), and arrest campaigns (11). This brings the total number of Israeli ground incursions into Syrian territory to more than 200 operations in an area of more than 600 square kilometers, extending north to include Druze villages adjacent to the Syrian-Lebanese border in the Damascus countryside. It also includes most of the Yarmouk Basin southwest of Daraa, the remnants of Syrian-controlled areas in Quneitra, and dozens of square kilometers in the southwest of the Damascus countryside.
3- The Air Influence Zone
Previous Israeli air operations targeting Iranian and Hezbollah assets, as well as Syrian regime positions, indicate that the Israeli air influence zone encompasses all of Syrian territory. Since the fall of the former regime, airstrikes have targeted military sites from Latakia and Tartus on the coast, to Aleppo, Damascus, and Daraa, reaching most of the country. However, the scope of air influence in the south extends to Damascus and eastern Sweida, encompassing the entire Syrian-Lebanese border strip. This serves two purposes: first, to enforce the demilitarization of all the territories south of Damascus, and second, to prevent the smuggling of weapons from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel has already begun implementing intensive aerial surveillance over southern Syria since mid-March 2025, using drones, following comprehensive campaigns of destruction of the Syrian army and its positions immediately after the fall of the regime. Benjamin Netanyahu and his Defense Minister, Israel Katz, have issued explicit warnings to the new Syrian administration against forming or deploying units of the new army (affiliated with the interim Ministry of Defense) in those provinces.
Indeed, Israel carried out its threats. On March 11, it began launching more than 40 airstrikes targeting heavy equipment belonging to the Ministry of Defense, as well as recently refurbished sites and offices. This came after the interim authorities announced the formation of the "Southern Division" or "40th Division."
Despite the warnings, the new administration attempted to test the seriousness of the Israeli position by opening a training camp for members of the division. However, the response was swift. On March 17, Israeli fighter jets launched more than 20 raids targeting division sites, killing two people and wounding 20 others.
4- The Strategic Area of Influence
Israeli interventions in southern Syria have always been subject to a kind of partial understanding, such as the coordination mechanism with Russia that began after its intervention in Syria in September 2015. However, all Israeli actions after the fall of the regime have become unilateral. Israel has defined the boundaries of its new influence with fire, as happened in April when its aircraft bombed the two most important air bases in central Syria to thwart a Turkish project to establish air bases and deploy advanced air defense platforms there.
Therefore, the strategic influence zone is estimated at approximately 53,000 square kilometers, including the southern governorates of Damascus, the southern Damascus countryside, Daraa, Quneitra, and Sweida, in addition to the southern half of Homs Governorate.
The above is also reinforced by Israel's ability to consolidate long-term control over key strategic corridors linking the Golan Heights and Damascus, such as the Damascus-Quneitra Road, which connects the capital Damascus to the Golan Heights, and the Khan Arnabeh-Jubata al-Khashab-Golan Road within Quneitra, which constitutes a major access route to the border areas. This is in addition to the mountain passes in the foothills of Mount Hermon, which provide routes for transporting reinforcements and maneuvering forces in the region.
Third: The Current Situation After the Israeli-Iranian War
With the fragility of the situation in Syria worsening after Israel launched a wave of airstrikes in mid-June targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, scientists, and other key infrastructure in Iran, Syria found itself in the midst of these hostilities, especially since Israel responded by launching several rounds of ballistic missiles and high-speed drones. While both sides used southern Syrian airspace to launch cross-border attacks, Syrian authorities remained virtually powerless to intervene, despite declaring their determination. To reduce the risk of the fighting spilling over into Syrian territory.
Although tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran have calmed for now, Syria remains vulnerable as long as Israel views Syrian instability as a threat to its national security. This threat also includes the threat posed by groups residing within the former regime, which maintain a limited presence in southwestern Syria. Although these groups do not pose a significant threat, they could destabilize the already fragile security situation by launching small, sporadic rocket attacks toward the Golan Heights. Such incidents could also undermine the limited trust between Israel and the new government in Damascus, and may restore the rules of engagement that prevailed in the southwest during Assad's rule, whereby Israel held the authorities in Damascus responsible for any attacks launched from that area.
While Israeli forces maintain a permanent military presence in the Quneitra border strip, this area was expanded during the conflict with Iran to include towns in the western Damascus countryside, in addition to the Damascus-Quneitra road. This extended area is particularly important due to its proximity to the capital; the town of Beit Jinn is located 35 kilometers away. Only on the outskirts of Damascus, and due to its mixed sectarian composition, there are several Christian and Druze villages on the slopes of Mount Hermon between the Syrian-Lebanese border and southwest of Damascus. Thus, the area of Israeli incursions now effectively includes the entire Quneitra Governorate and the Yarmouk Basin in southwest Daraa.
Fourth: The Current Situation Following the Escalation in Sweida
Since assuming power and beginning the process of consolidating power after the fall of the Assad regime, the head of the government in Damascus, Ahmad al-Sharaa, has sought to disarm the Druze factions in Sweida, the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria, and integrate them into the Ministry of Defense. He has also sought to disarm Ahmed al-Awda's groups in eastern Daraa, as well as other armed actors in the country. However, Sweida has proven to be a more complex problem for al-Sharaa and the interim authorities, not least because of Israeli intervention and Israel's "declaration" of protection for the Druze minority in Syria. Israel seeks to achieve two goals through this: first, to send an internal message to reassure the Druze minority within Israel itself; and second, to send a strategic message regarding the protection of Israel's undeclared national borders and ensuring its national security in the region.
Israel's Role in the Violence in Jisrin (Jaramana) and Ashrafieh Sahnaya – April and May 2025
The interim authorities tested Israel's seriousness during the recent clashes in Jaramana and Ashrafieh Sahnaya. On April 27, an audio recording attributed to a Druze cleric insulting the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) was leaked, sparking widespread anger and calls for retaliation from some Sunni circles. Violent protests erupted against the recording, initially targeting Druze students on university campuses before spreading to some 70 different locations across the country. On April 28, local armed groups and General Security units attacked two Druze areas near Damascus, Jaramana and Ashrafieh Sahnaya. The clashes resulted in dozens of deaths on both sides.
In this context, Israel set a new "red line," one that goes beyond demilitarization in the south. In a joint statement, Netanyahu and Katz pledged to prevent any attack targeting Druze groups or communities, including in Sweida itself. They said that the Israeli airstrikes in Sahnaya were a "strong message" that "Israel expects the Syrian authorities to prevent any harm to the Druze." This exacerbated the clash between the authorities in Damascus and the Druze. Although Israeli airstrikes in Sahnaya temporarily curbed the interim ambitions of the authorities in Sweida, the same sectarian nationalist rhetoric returned last July, with a renewed attempt to intervene in the Druze-majority province.
Israel's Role in the Mass Violence in Sweida
Compared to the violence near Damascus, Israel's response to the pro-government attacks in Sweida was slower. After clashes erupted between Bedouin groups and Druze factions in mid-July, the interim Ministry of Defense deployed more than 12,000 reinforcements to pressure the Druze to extract concessions. After a 24-hour vigilant surveillance, Israel launched a wave of airstrikes targeting advancing pro-government forces in northern and western Sweida, reportedly killing up to 300 fighters from the Ministry of Defense, the General Security, and pro-government armed groups.
Subsequently, Israeli airstrikes targeted several locations in central Damascus, including the Ministry of Defense building and the People's Palace itself, in a strong message to Sharaa and the interim authorities to back down. However, after a second wave of attacks between July 17 and 18, led by Bedouin militias supported by the interim authorities, Israel showed some flexibility. Although Israel initially announced that it would allow General Security units to enter the city of Sweida for a temporary period (as part of an initial ceasefire agreement that later failed), it then agreed to a tripartite ceasefire agreement on July 20, brokered by Syria, Jordan, and the United States. This agreement is still barely holding. This flexibility is likely the result of American pressure to halt the fighting in the south, rather than an Israeli retreat from its stated position of protecting the Druze in Sweida.
In this context, despite the holding of the tripartite ceasefire and the presence of flashpoints on key fronts in the north of Sweida Governorate, the discourse between the central state and the Druze has become fragile, if not fractured. Furthermore, despite the rhetoric used, new waves of violence are almost certain in the future, underscoring the growing and destabilizing role Israel plays in southern Syria. Meanwhile, a tripartite meeting between officials from Syria, Jordan, and the United States was held in Amman on August 12, resulting in the formation of a working group to monitor the ceasefire. However, the interim authorities appear to view the current ceasefire as a "tactical step." Despite the siege imposed around Sweida since mid-August, major attacks on the governorate are likely to resume once Sharaa determines his next strategy and this temporary calm expires.
Fifth: Future Scenarios
With the current situation continuing, future Israeli actions in southern and central Syria could range from the following scenarios:
Scenario 1: Continued military escalation: The soft environment that has consolidated in southern Syria since the fall of the former regime has provided Israel with an opportunity to expand its military operations, exploiting the security vacuum and internal instability. This may contribute to increased tensions with Syrian forces attempting to reassert control over the south.
Scenario 2: International mediation and regional interventions: The United States and the United Nations seek to restrain Israel by introducing new security arrangements, which may include international forces to monitor the border.
Scenario Three: Political Settlement and Redrawing Areas of Influence: The ongoing talks between the Damascus government and Tel Aviv, whether in Azerbaijan or France, may lead to a redefinition of areas of influence and military deployment, and the establishment of mechanisms to balance Israeli security concerns with regional stability and ensure a viable security arrangement.
Finally, with the soft environment established by the strategic shift resulting from the fall of the former Syrian regime and the decline of Iranian influence late last year, Israel is rushing to expand its influence within Syria to achieve geostrategic objectives. Although Tel Aviv initially claimed that its presence in post-Assad Syria would be "temporary," recent developments confirm Tel Aviv's efforts to strengthen its military presence on Syrian soil. Although repeated Israeli airstrikes and ground incursions are justified by the rhetoric of "demilitarizing southern Syria," the overall picture reveals long-term strategic objectives, giving Israel a pivotal role and an influential factor in the political and security transformation of post-Assad Syria.