The Militarization of Water in the Middle East: Dimensions and Contexts

With the end of the Cold War and the shift in the international political agenda to focus on issues of "comprehensive environmental security," particularly water issues, Arab countries have become aware of this problem, particularly in light of the threats posed by this issue that directly intersect with the determinants of Arab national security. This coincides with the increasing sources of security threats in the region, such as the growing threat of terrorist organizations and armed militias, and the continued regional interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries. These threats have imposed increased risks to water security in light of the growing shortage of water resources, which is directly proportional to the increase in demand for water, high population growth rates, worsening water waste, non-renewable water resources, declining rainfall rates, and rising global warming. This is in addition to the dilapidated purification services and the lack of access to clean water in crowded cities, among many others.

It's worth noting that international reports indicate that more than 83% of the Middle East's population lives in areas of high or very high water stress, compared to the global average of approximately 50%. Furthermore, more than 60% of the region's water resources originate outside national borders, which increases the likelihood of water conflict scenarios "water wars", given the academically observed models of "turbulent waters."

This is consistent with what has become known as the "globalization of political instability," and the resulting diverse uses of the water determinant as a "weapon" for pressure, war, or terrorism, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. There are a number of questions of interest regarding the contexts of using water as a weapon in managing existing political and security conflicts, and its impact on the future of the region. This is evident in a review of the following points:

The nature of "Water Militarization"

Water Militarization is defined as one of the unconventional tools used to control, extend hegemony, and ensure legitimacy by actors who adopt the conflict framework as a determinant of survival in competition. This involves using water as a strategic weapon to extend influence and advance political and military objectives in a given conflict, such as resolving a battle or undermining one of its parties, or by harnessing it as a tool for cooperation. This is achieved through the following strategies:

•  The "Strategic Militarization" strategy: This strategy is based on the premise that there are two types of strategic militarization: the first involves using water to control large areas of land to achieve sovereignty, and the second involves using it as a bargaining chip to finance military activities such as purchasing weapons. Strategic militarism also includes targeting or destroying large population centers, industrial facilities, and other infrastructure with the aim of imposing hegemony and encircling and besieging other parties to the conflict.
•  "Tactical militarism" strategy: This type manifests itself in the use of water as a weapon on the battlefield, to provide direct and immediate support for military operations, or its use against targets of significant military importance, such as harnessing water weapons to limit the advance of regular armies.
•  "Psychological militarism" strategy: This type of militarism involves instilling fear among non-combatants by denying them access to or contaminating water supplies. Actors resort to what is called "water terrorism," both at the strategic and tactical levels.
•  "Incentive militarization" strategy: This type of militarization involves using water as a weapon to ensure the legitimacy of the ruling authority, or as a reward for citizen support.
•  "Unintended militarization" strategy: When the use of water as a weapon causes collateral damage to civilians or the ecological environment, this is called unintended militarization. For example, unintended population displacement—in cases of floods or drought—is a frequent form of such collateral damage.

Diverse Uses

The operational reality of the troubled states in the Middle East has given a vital character to the strategic uses of "water militarization." It has also created new contexts worthy of analysis, particularly with the use of water as a key tool in managing or resolving existing conflicts, as well as at the level of bilateral and multilateral cooperation arrangements. This is as follows:

•  Establishing legitimacy: This point is based on the systematic/institutional actions of the nation-state, through the use of water resources and infrastructure networks as a qualitative weapon to establish legitimacy. On the other hand, non-state actors may exploit the "water weapon" to legitimize their control over specific areas. For example, the Houthis have deliberately exploited the water card to legitimize their presence and redraw the group's influence over Yemeni territory.
•  Limiting the advance of regular armies: Non-state actors have employed the water card to limit the advance of regular armies during a conflict. For example, the actions of ISIS, particularly after its decline and loss of much of the territory it controlled in 2016 in Syria and Iraq, allowed the organization to negotiate with tribal sheikhs allowing Red Crescent maintenance teams to enter some conflict zones to repair damage and restore drinking water to those areas, in exchange for disengaging from the Syrian National Army. This issue was discussed again in early 2017 following the failure of negotiations to restore water to the Syrian capital, in what was dubbed the "water truce”.
•  Terrorist group control: One of the most significant examples of "unintended militarization" on the ground. For example, following ISIS's control over most of Syria's Euphrates Valley, a Ministry of Agriculture was established to determine which crops could be grown. Farmers were taxed, while the organization's experts in this field became increasingly scarce, leading to a deterioration in irrigation services compared to pre-2011 levels. Local farmers also lost access to fertilizers and pesticides, which became scarce and expensive and could only be purchased from areas controlled by the Assad regime via smugglers. Consequently, the drying up of agricultural land and the spoilage of crops contributed to further internal fighting in Syria.
•  Exacerbating tribal competition: If the risk of water scarcity increases, it is likely that tribal and clan competition will increase—especially in countries experiencing political crisis and social divisions—unless strict measures are taken to address the diverse uses of water by the population, reduce some waste through the use of modern irrigation technologies, and abandon or regulate the timing of water-intensive crops such as cotton.
•  Stirring up discontent among population sectors: This is done by weaponizing water infrastructure as a military tool. A state or a sub-state actor uses water assets already under its control or after they have been seized to terrorize the population, extract concessions from opponents, or directly support tactical objectives in the context of military action.
•  Interventions by regional powers: Given that many Arab water resources originate outside geographical and political borders, the specific roles of regional powers in this regard are highlighted. For example, Turkish water projects have constituted vital uses of water militarization patterns, in accordance with the political and security contexts of both the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and the Peace Pipeline Project. This is also the case with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which represents one of the mechanisms of "water militarization," reflecting "motivational strategies" with mixed effects. On the one hand, it works to encircle and besiege the water security of the two downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan), while on the other hand, it works to grant the existing regime "political legitimacy," given the internal propaganda messages contained in Ethiopian discourse, through which it seeks to consolidate the legitimacy of the existing regime to counter the growing negative repercussions of ethnic chaos.
•  Cooperative uses: Cooperation in the field of water in times of conflict, which is in itself a form of weaponization. For example, a scenario of mutual coordination is resorted to to organize and maximize benefits. Bilateral and multilateral, with the aim of overcoming the scenario of water cuts to besiege civilian populations and achieve various political and military objectives in this regard.

Based on the above, the international community has issued more than 3,600 treaties and agreements to regulate and divide water resources, including 149 agreements signed in the twentieth century. This underscores the importance of reconsidering and anticipating the future potential uses of the water determinant as a strategic weapon, given: first, the fragility of legal applications regarding the management and sharing of shared international water resources; and second, the weakness and fragility of Arab political systems, particularly in the region's crisis-ridden countries. This hinders effective responses to the unilateral water policies pursued by many emerging powers such as Israel, Turkey, Iran, and other non-state actors such as the Houthi group and ISIS, which now threaten the future of "water security" in the Arab region. Third: The importance of taking into account the changing nature of water policies - both existing and potential - in a way that may add dual dimensions and potential and intertwined stakes that blend conflict and cooperation in the Middle East region.