Tianjin Summit 2025: Reading into the Political, Economic, and Strategic Implications

مركز سياسات للبحوث والدراسات الاستراتيجية

 

This Report is Available in Arabic Language - From Here

 

The Tianjin 2025 Summit represents a significant step toward reshaping the international order. It brought together more than twenty leaders and representatives of ten international organizations, clearly demonstrating Beijing's desire to transform the forum from a limited coordination framework into a platform with growing geopolitical and economic weight. The summit featured the adoption of a "Development Strategy for the Next Decade," which aimed to enhance cooperation in energy, technology, and the digital economy, along with political messages, most notably the Xi-Modi meeting, which reflected a trend toward easing border tensions and opening new channels of balance. The summit also confirmed the depth of Russian-Chinese coordination in the face of Western pressure, while the presence of the UN Secretary-General provided additional international legitimacy. Regionally, the participation of Egypt and Turkey emerged as evidence of the forum's expanding influence in the Middle East. Despite its limited ability to produce unified positions, the summit established multipolarity as a realistic option and provided Middle Eastern countries with an opportunity to expand their economic and political options, away from sharp alignments.

Introduction

In late August and early September, the Chinese city of Tianjin hosted a summit described as one of the most prominent international events of the year, not only for the size and intensity of the attendees, but also for its profound strategic implications, revealing the trends of the new international order as it takes shape. The summit brought together more than twenty leaders and representatives of ten international organizations, transforming it from a mere regional forum into a multilateral platform reflecting the new balance of power and responding to the rapid shifts in global politics. The summit came at a time of major crises, including the escalating technological and economic conflict between the United States and China, the worsening security challenges extending from Ukraine to the South China Sea, and the growing pressures of climate change and the supply chain crisis. All of this made Tianjin a testing ground for China's ability to formulate an alternative or parallel framework to the traditional international order and to attract partners seeking to reduce their dependence on the Western system.

The most prominent feature of the summit was the clarity of China's vision aimed at giving the forum greater weight in the architecture of the multipolar international order. Beijing announced a broad agenda that included the adoption of a "development strategy for the next decade," encompassing issues such as the digital economy, clean energy, and financial integration. In this sense, the summit is no longer merely a symbolic showcase, but rather an attempt to establish the foundations for long-term cooperation that can provide participating countries with a new institutional umbrella that transcends improvisation and provides greater stability in economic and security relations. In addition to the economic dimensions, the bilateral meetings—particularly the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—reflected an awareness among major Asian powers of the need to contain tensions and strike a balance that prevents internal exhaustion that would weaken their position in confronting global challenges.

On the broader international level, the summit embodied Russia and China's desire to build a network of alliances that enhances their ability to maneuver in the face of Western sanctions and pressure. The presence of President Vladimir Putin sent a message that Moscow still possesses a broad scope for international partnerships despite attempts to isolate it, and that Beijing provides Russia with political and economic cover that enhances its resilience. In contrast, the UN presence, represented by Secretary-General António Guterres, provided additional international legitimacy for the summit, giving China the leverage to assert that it is not an adversary of the West but rather a force seeking to forge a more balanced and inclusive order. Thus, the Tianjin Summit marked a turning point between the symbolic nature of coordination that characterized previous summits and a deeper shift toward building alternative or parallel institutions to the existing order. This gives this summit special value in the context of current discussions about the future of multipolarity.

First: Implications and Contexts of the Tianjin Summit 2025

The Tianjin Summit 2025 was held at a pivotal moment in global transformations, as the international system is undergoing rapid restructuring as a result of the accumulation of major crises, from the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war to the technological and energy competition between East and West. These intertwined crises have created a state of geopolitical fluidity that no longer allows for the continuation of the traditional dualism that has governed the global system over the past decades. Instead, they have prompted the emergence of new types of transregional alliances in which economic dimensions intertwine with considerations of security, technology, and energy. Hence, the convening of the summit in Tianjin was not merely a protocol event or a temporary economic forum. Rather, it represented a prominent sign that rising powers and the Global South are seeking to create alternative or parallel platforms to those dominated by the West, in an attempt to redistribute power and influence in a more expansive and pluralistic manner.

China and Russia vs. the West

China presented the summit as an extension of its broader project aimed at reshaping the rules of the global economic order, putting forward a narrative of an "alternative platform" that challenges the dominance of Western institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. This approach was not merely a propaganda effort; it was supported by practical initiatives related to expanding access to advanced technology and developing alternative supply chain routes, especially after the imposition of strict Western restrictions in sensitive areas such as semiconductors and renewable energy. Beijing used the summit to confirm its ability to build strategic partnerships beyond its regional scope and to present itself as a global leader on issues such as the green transformation and equitable development, in contrast to what it sees as the exclusionary policies pursued by the United States and its allies.

Russia, for its part, saw the summit as an opportunity to reassert its position within the international power equation, especially after the pressures and isolation imposed on it in the wake of the Ukraine war. Moscow used the summit to affirm its continued ability to maneuver within the international system, presenting itself as a reliable player in the field of traditional energy and natural resources, capitalizing on the growing need of many countries in the Global South to secure alternative sources away from Western markets. Through its active involvement in the summit, Russia sought to emerge as a party capable of reshaping the balance of power, not only in Eurasia but also in regions extending to the Middle East and Africa, where energy, food, and water are existential issues. In this sense, Russia's presence was not only a reflection of an attempt to escape isolation, but also a signal that Moscow remains an unavoidable international player.

The Global South: Reproducing the Discourse of Economic Justice

From another perspective, the Tianjin Summit provided a central platform for countries in the Global South that have long felt marginalized in international governance structures. Delegations from Asia, Africa, and Latin America expressed their desire to re-introduce the discourse of economic justice at the international level, with a focus on the right to sustainable development and reforming international financial institutions, which are accused of imposing austerity programs and restrictive conditions on developing countries. These countries appeared to be taking advantage of the current international climate to highlight their position as a key driver of any new world order, building on the fact that the Global South comprises more than two-thirds of the world's population and is an indispensable partner on food, energy, and climate issues. Thus, the summit became an arena for highlighting a new symbolic power for the countries of the South, based on their rejection of subordination to the Western system and their efforts to form a broader negotiating bloc that supports their demands for a fair distribution of resources and equal access to technology.

The Regional Dimension: The Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa

The summit's momentum was not limited to major powers or traditional countries of the South, but extended to regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa, where attempts to build new coordination frameworks to address structural challenges were clearly evident. Issues of food, water, and energy security have emerged as urgent issues in light of the increasing pressures resulting from the war in Ukraine and climate change, as these regions find themselves facing multiple crises related to resource scarcity, rising prices, and weak infrastructure. The Arab presence at the summit, particularly from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, demonstrated that interactions are no longer limited to Asian or Eurasian blocs, but rather reflect new dynamics that enable the Arab world to engage in broader networks of cooperation. Egypt leveraged the summit to affirm its position as a strategic gateway linking Asian markets with Africa and Europe via the Suez Canal, while Saudi Arabia leveraged its participation to promote its energy vision within "Vision 2030," strengthening its position as a global energy power beyond oil. The UAE, meanwhile, sought to consolidate its position as a financial and trade intermediary capable of serving as a bridge between major powers and emerging markets. This diverse Arab presence, which intersects with the summit's priorities, reflects a growing awareness among the region's countries that the reshaping of the international order is already taking place outside of traditional Western frameworks, and that engaging in such platforms is no longer a complementary option but a strategic necessity.

The Summit as a Platform for Transregional Alliances

The Tianjin Summit clearly demonstrated that emerging international alliances are no longer governed by traditional geographic or military affiliations, but are instead based on intertwined networks of transregional interests, combining issues of technology, energy, supply chains, and economic security. This hybrid nature of the new alliances reflects a trend toward establishing a multidimensional international bloc that balances the ambitions of major powers such as China and Russia, the aspirations of the Global South, and the interests of regional actors in the Middle East and Africa. In this sense, the summit represents the beginning of a path that may lead to the crystallization of alliances that transcend the emerging bipolarity between Washington and Beijing, in favor of a more complex multilateralism shaped around shared issues rather than ideological boundaries.

Overall, it can be said that the Tianjin 2025 Summit was not merely a forum for economic consultations, but rather a pivotal point for revealing the nature of the new balances crystallizing in the international system. Rising powers are now capable of formulating alternative agendas, and countries of the Global South are more willing to assert their presence. Meanwhile, regional actors are no longer merely marginal parties, but rather active partners in shaping power equations. If this trajectory continues, the world may witness a fundamental redistribution of centers of influence in the coming years, with the relative weight of traditional Western institutions declining in favor of a more expansive and interactive multipolarity, in which the interests of the East and the South intersect with those of emerging regional powers, in a formula that could redefine the nature of the global order in the coming decades.

Second: Washington's Vision and American Reactions to the 2025 Tianjin Summit

The Official American Position: Between Concern and Strategic Caution

Official reactions from the White House and the US State Department revealed that Washington views the 2025 Tianjin Summit as a growing challenge to the international order established by the United States since the end of the Cold War. Although the summit did not explicitly declare itself an alternative to traditional Western institutions, its expansion and the inclusion of more countries and international organizations were viewed in official US discourse as a systematic attempt to undermine American influence within institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Official statements confirm that the summit reflects a Chinese-Russian tendency to restructure the international order on principles that conflict with what Washington calls the "rules-based international order," a term the US administration uses to emphasize the centrality of the West in formulating the laws and regulations governing global trade and security. In this context, the US State Department spokesperson's statements indicated that "any economic or political gathering that seeks to bypass established multilateral institutions raises real concerns about transparency, standards, and adherence to international law." This reflects Washington's awareness that Tianjin may be more than just an economic platform, but rather a prelude to building a competing bloc.

Academic and Media Position: Divided Assessments

American academic and media analyses were marked by a degree of divergence, reflecting the difficulty of predicting the summit's outcomes. While some researchers considered the Tianjin summit to be nothing more than a "Chinese-Russian attempt to create an international space alternative to the West," others argued that the summit remains an incoherent framework, facing major institutional challenges related to the ability of member states to unify an economic and development agenda in light of the deep geopolitical contradictions among them. Major think tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Brookings have indicated that the summit's success is not measured by political slogans, but rather by its ability to transform recommendations into practical initiatives in the areas of finance, investment, and transregional infrastructure. Research papers published by Carnegie and RAND also noted that the participation of traditional allies of Washington, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, carries an important indication that engagement in alternative frameworks is no longer the preserve of anti-Western states, but has become an option even for strategic partners of the United States. This reflects the beginning of the erosion of Washington's ability to monopolize influence within its traditional axes. The American press, for its part, highlighted this contradiction, with some major newspapers, such as the Washington Post, viewing the summit as "more of a symbolic challenge than a practical one," while the Financial Times and Foreign Policy argued that the symbolism itself is sufficient to bring about gradual shifts in the global geopolitical map.

Implications of American Concern: Rising Multilateralism and Declining Western Monopoly

A careful reading of the American position reveals that the primary concern is not related to the summit as a separate event, but rather to the broader trend it represents: the emergence of non-Western platforms capable of formulating alternative agendas and parallel institutions that undermine the centrality of the West. Washington recognizes that the continuation of this trend means a gradual decline in its ability to impose conditions and standards through its traditional tools. The expansion of participation in the summit to include countries from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America reinforces the notion that Tianjin is not merely a limited regional bloc, but rather a transregional framework that may reproduce alliances similar to the Non-Aligned Movement or the Group of 77, but within a more institutional context and linked to direct strategic interests such as energy, food, and technology security. Hence, the official and academic American positions intersect at a fundamental point: the summit's success in establishing itself as an executive platform with a unified agenda will pose a fundamental threat to US hegemony over the international system.

Washington's ability to formulate practical alternatives will likely be tested through programs such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure (PGII), launched in 2022 as an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative. The success or failure of these programs will be a key factor in determining the United States' ability to consolidate its influence in Africa and Asia, where finance and infrastructure are the primary levers of influence.

Implications for Regional Partners

For countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the American divergence opens up ample room for strategic maneuvering. These countries can use their presence at the Tianjin summit as a bargaining chip to improve their terms of engagement with Washington, whether by obtaining more economic support or strengthening security arrangements. Their presence in Tianjin also reflects a growing trend toward "flexible multilateralism," where complete alignment with either the United States or China is no longer the only option, but rather a balance between the two superpowers to maximize their gains. This dimension reveals that Washington's concern is not only the rise of China as an economic competitor, but also the openness of traditional allies to alternative networks of influence, weakening America's monopoly over the levers of the international order.

Third - An Executive Comparison with Previous Summits: From Dialogue to Institutionalization

Scale of Attendance and Expanding International Participation

Comparing the 2025 Tianjin Summit with its predecessors in Samarkand 2022 and Johannesburg 2023, it is clear that attendance is no longer merely a numerical indicator, but rather an expression of a growing international desire to engage in an alternative framework that departs from the dominance of traditional Western institutions. While the Samarkand Summit was limited to a mere fifteen countries with varying representation, and the Johannesburg Summit was dominated by a regional-international character with a similar number of participants, the Tianjin Summit marked a qualitative shift, bringing together leaders from more than twenty countries, along with ten major international organizations. This expansion in attendance reflects that the forum is now viewed as an attractive platform that goes beyond economic coordination, becoming a space for reshaping perceptions of international balance, as non-Western countries seek to consolidate their presence and assert their interests outside the frameworks led by Washington and Brussels.

The agenda shifts from traditional economics to comprehensive issues

Previous summits focused primarily on traditional economic and energy issues, making them more of a technical or commercial coordination forum. In Samarkand, for example, the focus was on energy projects and logistical connectivity, while discussions on security or technological aspects did not go beyond passing references. The Tianjin summit, however, shifted the agenda to a more comprehensive and expansive level, combining the themes of economic security, modern technology, and global supply chains. This shift indicates a growing awareness among organizers and participating countries that current challenges are no longer purely economic, but are directly related to strategic technology, food security, and issues of controlling global trade flows. In other words, the agenda is no longer merely a reflection of cooperation between emerging economies, but rather a reflection of a political-economic project aimed at formulating new rules for the global order.

The Rise of Political Character and the Affirmation of Multipolarity

One of the most notable manifestations of the transformation at the Tianjin Summit was that it did not hesitate to present itself as a symbol of the birth of a multipolar international balance, unlike its two predecessors, which were content with more restrained rhetoric and general signals. In Tianjin, the public discourse was more explicit in criticizing the "Western monopoly" and presenting the forum as an alternative platform allowing non-Western countries to express their collective interests. This development demonstrates that the summit no longer views itself solely as an economic forum, but rather as a soft political tool that presents a discourse competing with post-Cold War Western arrangements. In contrast, previous summits were more like economic conferences with a limited political tone, contenting themselves with closing statements that were more declarative in nature than explicitly political.

Institutional Outcomes and the Transition from Declarations to Initiatives

The most telling indicator of the shift toward institutionalization is the summit outcomes. While the Samarkand and Johannesburg summits concluded with general closing statements focused primarily on declaring intent and affirming principles of cooperation, the Tianjin summit proposed practical steps in the form of joint financing and development initiatives. These initiatives reflect a collective awareness that the international legitimacy of any forum is not built on symbolic statements alone, but rather on the ability to produce implementation tools that provide continuity and direct impact. With this transition, Tianjin has taken a further step toward establishing a quasi-institutional framework, reminiscent of the experience of other economic and political blocs that began as dialogue platforms before transforming into established entities.

Political Symbolism and the Establishment of an Image of a Global Alternative

It cannot be overlooked that the symbolism surrounding the Tianjin summit surpassed that of its predecessors. It was promoted in the media and diplomatically as a platform against Western hegemony and an expression of a new global path beyond the centrality of traditional Western institutions. While the Samarkand and Johannesburg summits were symbolic regional-global gatherings, they did not carry the character of a direct confrontation with the West. Rather, they sought balance without escalating rhetoric. This new symbolism reflects the participating countries' desire to send a political message to the international community that multilateralism is no longer a theoretical option, but rather a reality gradually embodied through such summits.

Fourth: Egyptian Participation in the 2025 Tianjin Summit

Egypt Between Western Legacy and Asian Transformations

The participation of Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly in the 2025 Tianjin Summit reflects a strategic shift in Cairo's perception of the sources of balance and opportunities in the changing international order. For decades, Egyptian foreign policy has been based on two main axes: a close alliance with the United States and economic relations with the European Union. However, the relative decline in Washington's commitment to the Middle East—particularly after its gradual withdrawal from the Iraq and Syria issues, and its increasing focus on the Pacific and Indian Oceans in the context of confronting China—has prompted Cairo to seek alternative paths that would grant it a greater margin of independence and strengthen its negotiating position. In this context, the Tianjin Summit seemed an ideal opportunity for Egypt to redefine its position in international balances by expanding its partnership with Beijing and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is establishing a model different from traditional Western blocs.

Advanced Economic Agenda: Investment and Technology

During the summit, the Egyptian delegation held a series of high-level meetings with major Chinese companies, such as Sinohydro Hydropower, BYD Electric Vehicles, and CGN Nuclear and Renewable Energy, with the aim of discussing expanding the scope of Chinese investments in Egypt. These meetings were not limited to traditional infrastructure projects, but also included sectors of strategic priority for Cairo:

- Renewable energy and water desalination to address the crises of resource scarcity and climate change.

- Manufacturing electric vehicles and batteries to support industrial transformation plans and reduce dependence on fuel imports.

- Technology transfer and direct investment beyond mere commodity trade, establishing a long-term technological partnership.

This approach reflects Egypt's desire to move from the "importer and consumer" model to the "productive partner" position, in line with Egypt's Vision 2030, which focuses on sustainability and industrial transformation. Therefore, the Tianjin summit represented a test of Cairo's ability to attract quality investments from Beijing.

True Multilateralism and Confronting Unilateralism

On the political front, Cairo stood out during the summit by adopting a distinct discourse based on three main pillars:

1. True multilateralism: meaning openness to all international powers without being dependent on any one axis.

2. Fair globalization: emphasizing that the international economic order must take into account the interests of developing countries, not remain captive to traditional Western centers.

3. Rejecting unilateral hegemony: by moving closer to the Chinese vision of a "community with a shared destiny for humanity."

This shift in discourse places Egypt at a delicate intersection between a traditional Western axis whose fragility in the region is increasing, and an emerging Asian axis offering more flexible and less conditional alternatives, enhancing Cairo's ability to maneuver and gain additional negotiating leverage.

The Tianjin Summit and the Contexts of Gaza and the Middle East

Egypt's participation in the Tianjin Summit was not separate from its immediate regional context. Rather, it was closely linked to the region's volatile issues, most notably the Gaza crisis and the resulting regional escalation. As the pivotal mediator between Israel and Palestinian factions, Cairo seeks to leverage its rapprochement with both Beijing and Moscow to expand diplomatic support for its initiatives, particularly given their permanent membership in the UN Security Council, which gives them the ability to influence international resolutions. Within this framework, China presents a discourse supporting Palestinian rights based on rejecting the traditional American approach biased toward Israel. Meanwhile, Russia is attempting to consolidate its presence in the Middle East as a counterweight to American hegemony. This provides Egypt with additional opportunities to build a new international support network that strengthens its role as a regional mediator and provides it with more effective tools for managing regional balances.

Implications of Egypt's Strategic Transformation

The strategic implications of Egypt's participation in the Tianjin Summit are evident in its expression of a restructuring of Cairo's orientations at the international and regional levels. Cairo is no longer captive to the traditional Western axis, but rather seeks to emerge as a more independent player seeking to rebalance its international alliances. This is reflected in the redefinition of national security priorities by focusing on the economy and technology as tools of power to counter military forces. This participation also reflects Egypt's orientation toward expanding its regional mediation tools by leveraging Asian support for sensitive issues such as Gaza, Libya, and the Red Sea. This provides it with additional leverage in regional interactions, and it carries a clear message to the West that Egypt now possesses realistic alternatives and will not remain hostage to American or European pressure.

Conclusion

The summit confirms the beginning of a potential institutional restructuring phase in the Eurasian-Asia space. However, the degree of success of this restructuring will depend primarily on the suitability of the available financial instruments with the legal and technical framework required to implement the projects. Based on current interaction trajectories, the most likely scenario for the period 2026–2028 appears to be a network expansion scenario (the pragmatic scenario), where a significant number of bilateral/sectoral partnerships are expected to be implemented, while central frameworks take longer to actually take shape. Part III will provide a detailed economic analysis of the announced financing instruments, project implementation paths, their impact on value chains, and Egypt's potential to benefit from or be exposed to them.

In light of the aforementioned in-depth analysis of the dimensions of the Tianjin 2025 Summit, it can be said that the summit represents a pivotal moment in the process of reshaping the international order, not only in terms of its symbolic significance linked to the high-profile leadership presence and global media coverage, but also in terms of its practical content, which sought to balance economic, security, and development dimensions within a comprehensive vision for the next decade. The adoption of the "Development Strategy for the Next Ten Years" demonstrates that Beijing views the forum not only as a platform for periodic coordination, but also as a gradual tool for reengineering economic and political relations in Asia and beyond. Although this ambition is hampered by the divergent priorities of member states and their conflicting interests on sensitive issues, the summit has opened a window for establishing new mechanisms for cooperation based on balanced mutual benefits.

The summit also highlighted that the logic of multipolarity is no longer merely a theoretical discourse or a tool to counter Western influence, but is beginning to translate into concrete initiatives in the areas of energy, infrastructure, and technological cooperation. This reflects a gradual trend toward building parallel or complementary institutions to the traditional international order, providing middle- and developing countries with greater opportunities for action and maneuver. However, this dynamic remains hostage to the success of major powers, led by China, Russia, and India, in managing internal balances and preventing internal contradictions from turning into vulnerabilities exploited by Western powers to disrupt these processes.

From another perspective, the summit gave a clear signal that regions such as the Middle East and Africa are no longer the exclusive sphere of Western influence, but rather a strategic target for both Chinese and Russian openness. The participation of Egypt and Turkey, along with other countries, demonstrates that the forum is gradually becoming a "bridge" platform that allows these countries to expand their strategic options without being forced to align strictly with one party at the expense of another. For Cairo, the summit represented an opportunity to affirm its role as a pivotal player in the Africa-Asia connectivity equation, while for Ankara, it served as a tool to enhance its relative independence and expand its influence.

Ultimately, the Tianjin 2025 Summit can be viewed as a foundational milestone in a long-term process of redefining the rules of the international game. While the forum still lacks binding institutional capacity and suffers from the divergent positions of its members, its political and economic momentum makes it an unavoidable framework in the coming years. To the extent that it succeeds in translating the slogans of multilateralism and cooperation into practical projects, it will become a driving force for a more balanced and diverse global order. For middle-income countries, leveraging this platform with political flexibility and strategic realism will remain one of their most important tools for maintaining an influential position amid an uncertain international environment.

 

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