Paths of Attraction Toward China Under Confrontational US Diplomacy

 

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Abstract

US diplomacy under the second Trump administration has been characterized by confrontation and economic and security pressure, prompting major powers such as India and Russia to reposition themselves strategically, while China has exploited these gaps to expand its influence. For India, technology, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, and maritime space have presented complex arenas for balancing US pressure with selective openness to Chinese offers, within the framework of a "flexible balancing" policy. As for Russia, Western sanctions have pushed it to deepen its partnership with Beijing through energy trade, monetary alliances, and military coordination, which has reinforced the overlapping paths between Moscow and Beijing. Conversely, the convergence of the three axes (India-Russia-China) has provided a new structure for Eurasian interactions, but they remain filled with complementary gaps and latent competition. At the systemic level, the study indicates that these interactions are reshaping the international balance, through the decline of unipolarity and the rise of "flexible zones" for managing competition, opening the door to a more interconnected and less stable international system.

Introduction

Since US President Donald Trump's return to the White House in January 2025, US foreign policy has entered a new phase of structural tensions. This can be described as an intensified continuation of the "confrontational diplomacy" approach that characterized his first term, with the addition of greater doses of public frankness and a rush to use economic and political pressure tools. Under Trump, Washington appears to no longer care about the traditional diplomatic cover that previous administrations—both Republican and Democratic—were keen to maintain. Instead, it has shifted to a phase of declaring positions without equivocation, employing the language of "deals" rather than the institutional rhetoric typically associated with multilateral institutions. This new—or rather, more in-depth—approach has imposed itself on major global issues: from relations with European allies, to competition with China and Russia, to energy, security, and climate issues.

While the Tianjin Summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in February 2025 could be considered a symbolic indicator of the ongoing transformations, it was, in fact, a direct reflection of the repercussions of American diplomacy under Trump II. India, long described as a "strategic partner" of the United States in confronting China, had no qualms about holding a high-level bilateral summit with Beijing despite bitter border disputes. This reflects how American confrontationalism may push traditional partners to seek alternatives, or at least to diversify their strategic options away from complete dependence on Washington.

First - The Structural Framework of Trump's Diplomacy

1. Excessive Candor as a Diplomatic Tool

"Excessive candor" constitutes the most obvious characteristic of Trump's diplomacy, a frankness that transcends the boundaries of traditional diplomacy, sometimes resembling deliberate provocation. While previous US administrations preferred to formulate positions in more flexible ways to maintain the continuity of strategic relations, Trump has adopted a direct discourse based on calling things by their names and presenting threats or economic pressures without ambiguity. In his first term, he did not hesitate to impose punitive tariffs on major trading partners such as India and Turkey, justifying this by protecting American industries. At the same time, he sent a clear message that American economic interests trump any alliance or political considerations. He also used economic and military aid as a negotiating bargaining chip, evident in his threats to countries such as Egypt and South Africa, where he did not hesitate to threaten to reduce aid or reconsider existing agreements unless these countries responded to US demands. In his second term (2025), this trend has intensified, as the language of trade deals has become a direct diplomatic tool, and regional security has become a bargaining chip and a price-tag in his negotiations with allies and adversaries alike. This trend is not seen as an exception, but rather as a deliberate approach based on making economic deals the norm for international relations, according to Trump's vision.

2. Marginalization of Multilateral Institutions

The second structural characteristic is Trump's tendency to diminish the importance of multilateral institutions. This distinguishes him from most of his predecessors, who relied on these institutions as a framework for managing alliances and distributing political and economic costs. While previous administrations employed platforms such as NATO, the G7, and the UN Security Council to coordinate policies with allies, Trump treated these institutions as a burden that restricted American decision-making. Therefore, he has always preferred direct bilateral negotiations, where the United States can impose its terms from a position of strength and avoid collective commitments that could weaken its influence. This tendency was clearly evident in his repeated criticism of NATO and his accusation that European countries are not shouldering their share of the defense burden, as well as in his insistence on transforming international meetings into platforms for announcing bilateral deals rather than adopting collective positions. In doing so, Trump redefined the international order from a multilateral institutional framework to a space closer to a network of unstable bilateral deals, making many countries realize the fragility of collective umbrellas under Trump's leadership.

3. Redefining Alliances

Trump's understanding of alliances is radically different from the classic American conception. While previous administrations viewed alliances as long-term commitments that enhance international stability and limit rival influence, Trump has treated them as temporary arrangements that can be modified or terminated depending on circumstances. This shift has made major partners like India realize that a "strategic partnership" with Washington does not necessarily provide immunity from economic or political pressure, and that an alliance could turn into a tool of blackmail if the country in question does not comply with Trump's conditions. Russia, for its part, has reinforced this understanding through its long experience with Western sanctions, concluding that any hope of a "reset" with Washington has evaporated, and that alliances in the Trumpian vision are not based on shared values ​​or institutional commitments, but rather on short-term, immediate calculations. The natural result is Moscow's increased attraction to Beijing, a partner that offers more stable guarantees and less volatile positions.

4. The Shrinking of America's Trust Capital

The three aforementioned characteristics combine to produce a profound strategic impact: the shrinking of America's trust capital. Since World War II, Washington has enjoyed an image of being the most stable and predictable state, making it a reference for international alliances and a haven for countries seeking protection or economic support. However, with the rise of Trump, this image has been radically shaken. Partner countries no longer view Washington as a long-term guarantor, but rather as a volatile actor that may shift its policies based on the president's personal mood or the internal calculations of the US election. This shrinking "trust capital" is one of the most important structural reasons explaining the tendency of major powers like India and Russia to seek alternative options, led by China, which presents itself as a more consistent partner in its orientations and better able to adhere to its long-term commitments.

In sum, the structural framework of Trump's diplomacy is based on provocative frankness, marginalization of multilateralism, and redefinition of alliances. These characteristics have transformed the United States from a "reliable power" to a "volatile partner." This shift not only affected Washington's image, but also led to a reshaping of international alignments. China became the primary beneficiary of the trust vacuum left by America, while Russia and India reshaped their approaches to international relations in a manner closer to Beijing. In the long term, this shift reflects a fundamental challenge to the international order shaped by the United States after 1945 and establishes new equations that will remain in place until the end of the current decade.

Second - The Indian Axis: Washington's Pressures and Beijing's Balancing

1. The Historical Background of a Complex Partnership

India represents a special case in international balances. Since its independence, it has followed a policy of non-alignment, which allowed it to navigate between the American and Soviet camps during the Cold War without absolute dependence on either. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, New Delhi gradually moved closer to Washington, especially as its fears of China's rapid rise grew. This rapprochement has culminated in the last two decades through defense cooperation (arms deals, joint naval exercises) and coordination within the Quad (United States, Japan, Australia, India) to balance Chinese influence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. However, the roots of this policy of independence have not disappeared; India has remained careful not to sever ties with Russia (its historical arms supplier) and to maintain open channels with Beijing despite border disputes.

2. US Pressures Under Trump

With Trump's return to the White House, the US-India relationship has taken a more complex path. The US president has not treated India as an absolutely immune strategic partner, but rather as a country that must abide by the rules of the game he imposes. This has been evident in several areas:

• Tariffs and Trade Agreements: Washington imposed tariffs on some Indian imports, believing that New Delhi was taking advantage of the trade system without sufficiently opening its markets to American goods. These measures were not limited to economic pressure; they also carried a symbolic meaning that India was not immune from "sanctions," even as a strategic partner.
• Russian energy: Washington pressured India to reduce its imports of Russian oil in light of Western sanctions, believing that continued dealings with Moscow would weaken the impact of the blockade on the Russian economy. However, New Delhi, which views Russian oil as a vital option for ensuring its energy security, refused to fully comply, revealing the limits of its compliance with American concerns.
• Relations with Pakistan: Trump did not hesitate to brandish military aid to Pakistan or claim mediation in the Kashmir dispute, angering India, which rejects any foreign interference in an issue it considers an "internal matter." This American behavior opened the door for Beijing to present itself as a party more respectful of India's sovereignty, even if it has opposing interests on the ground.

3. Tianjin Summit 2025:

The Tianjin Summit (February 2025) between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping is a landmark in India's foreign policy. Despite persistent border tensions (especially in the Ladakh region), the summit reflected a mutual desire to test the possibility of easing tensions and enhancing economic cooperation.

The summit's messages were twofold:

• On New Delhi's part, it demonstrated its ability to maneuver between Washington and Beijing, and that it is not subject to the dictates of one party, regardless of the degree of its partnership.
• On Beijing's part, it emphasized that China is capable of attracting even Washington's closest partners in Asia if the United States continues its confrontational approach.

This symbolism did not go unnoticed in Western circles; it was viewed as a "wake-up call" indicating that American pressure could backfire in the long run.

4. The Limits of India's Shift

However, it remains unrealistic to envision a complete strategic shift by India toward Beijing. There are structural factors that limit this:

• The border dispute: The protracted conflict in the Himalayas remains an obstacle to any complete strategic trust.
• India's international aspirations: Its pursuit of a permanent seat on the Security Council makes it wary of allying itself with China, which is reluctant to expand the international club.
• Defense dependence: Despite diversifying its arms sources, Washington remains an important source of advanced military technology that Beijing cannot easily provide.

These factors place India's path closer to "flexible balancing" between Washington and Beijing: neither a break with the United States nor an absolute alliance with China, but rather a constant pursuit of expanding options and maintaining independence.

Third: New Delhi's ability to balance between Washington and Beijing

1. Technology and artificial intelligence:

The year 2025 witnessed a notable shift in the issue of technological governance, with advanced technologies—particularly artificial intelligence—becoming an arena of strategic competition between Beijing and Washington, while also being a practical area for occasional cooperation with New Delhi. On the one hand, the United States imposes export restrictions on parts of the semiconductor supply chain and advanced technologies, using technological control as a tool of pressure and discrimination in relations. On the other hand, China seeks to expand its influence through standard initiatives and technology cooperation packages that offer investment incentives and research partnerships—including offers to integrate emerging countries into its technology chains and regional digital governance "bodies." This dynamic places India at a crossroads: Delhi has strong interests in building its domestic AI capabilities (research centers, startups, and a regulatory framework), but at the same time, it relies on advanced American technology in defense and sensitive sectors.

India is adopting a pragmatic stance in this area; it may show "cautious support" for Chinese regional AI initiatives if technical safeguards and data sovereignty are in place, while moving forward with partnerships with American companies to secure advanced technology. This balance, based on two opposing interests, allows Beijing a window for limited rapprochement with New Delhi on normative issues (such as an international body for governance on artificial intelligence), while the two sides maintain clear dividing lines in defense and sensitive areas. References indicate that Beijing has placed digital governance and AI at the top of its agenda for the 2025 summits, and that New Delhi is showing caution regarding Chinese proposals for normative hegemony, with a potential willingness to offer "conditional support."

2. Cooperation in Infrastructure and the Economy: Chinese Instruments of Influence Versus American Incentives

On the infrastructure front, China, through tools such as the Belt and Road Initiative and multifaceted financing initiatives, is offering realistic economic incentives: infrastructure loans, logistics projects, and investment networks linking Europe, Asia, and Africa. India has a clear interest in accelerating the construction of ports, land routes, and internal logistics connectivity to support growth and exports. However, India is also wary of unilaterally relying on its Chinese partner for strategic projects. Therefore, New Delhi appears to prefer "diversified infrastructure financing" (multi-party partnerships, multilateral financing, partnerships with Japan, the UAE, and the Gulf states) rather than accepting traditional Chinese offers that could undermine strategic independence.

In turn, China is using tangible economic tools to expand its influence, increasing pressure on Washington to provide alternative economic incentives (grants, credit facilities, special trade agreements) to prevent India from losing influence. This competition over infrastructure translates into a race for influence within the Indian economic and political elite and reinforces New Delhi's tendency to diversify its partners.

3. Maritime Tension in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea:

The maritime arena has witnessed an expansion of Chinese naval operations in areas that intersect with India's interests, and New Delhi has responded by increasing its naval presence and conducting joint exercises with regional partners. By 2025, India has begun to implement new examples of its maritime policy, including visions such as "Mahasagara," which expands its maritime security concept to include a presence beyond India's traditional coastline. This includes engagements and exercises in the South China Sea with partners such as the Philippines, and the establishment of logistical links on strategic islands. In practice, the Indian Navy has conducted patrol missions and bilateral cooperation with Southeast Asian countries to strengthen alternative sea lines of communication and monitor sensitive trade.

This expansion reflects a shift in India's naval power theory—from a logic of "regional deterrence" to one of "distant intervention capability" to prevent the creation of sustainable maritime hegemony for the benefit of one party. At the same time, Indian naval activities encourage strengthening security coordination with the United States, Japan, and Australia. However, in light of American pressure on other issues (such as trade and energy), New Delhi is keen to keep these partnerships functional and non-politically binding.

4. Implications of the Tech-Security Intertwining on Indian Budget Policy

Technological, maritime, and infrastructure issues intersect in what can be called the “tech-security-economics equation”: every technological or structural choice has security implications, and every security initiative dictates economic choices. A clear example: India’s desire to acquire advanced defense systems leads it to deepen its relations with the United States and the West. However, these relations expose it to the risk of political pressure (such as the imposition of tariffs or trade sanctions) if Washington does not meet its conditions on other issues (such as Russian energy). Conversely, China’s technological and financial offers may ease the pain of short-term trade-offs, but they carry the risk of long-term reliance on standard platforms and digital infrastructure that do not allow India autonomy in sensitive areas.

This equation is driving New Delhi toward a strategy of "fragmenting choices," by strengthening its domestic capabilities in artificial intelligence and semiconductors, signing open technology partnerships with the West, and simultaneously regulating limited cooperation with China on non-sensitive issues. All this is within the framework of a flexible foreign policy that seeks to contain multi-dimensional risks.

Evidence up to mid-2025 shows that New Delhi has adopted a pragmatic and gradual path: it does not fully align with any party, but rather increases its tools to secure its interests. Technology and artificial intelligence have become competitive arenas that present both opportunity and risk, and infrastructure and naval presence reflect India's attempts to occupy a broader strategic space. The practical result is a growing "flexible balancing" policy, which keeps India able to maneuver between Washington and Beijing, but without completely abandoning its options or abandoning essential sovereign interests.

Fourth - The Russian Axis: Between US Sanctions and Chinese Embrace

The Kremlin has become increasingly convinced that the Western path—as shaped by Washington's hardline policies—does not offer a stable economic outlet or sufficient political guarantees to overcome the effects of sanctions. This realization has prompted Moscow to accelerate its alliances with Beijing on the energy, finance, and defense fronts, such that the Russian-Chinese partnership represents a practical solution that partially compensates for the loss of Western financial and technological influence. In this section, we analyze the structure of this transformation, its practical tools, the limits of rapprochement with Beijing, and its implications for Russia's strategic effectiveness in confronting US pressure.

1. Intensifying Targeting the Backbone of the Russian Economy

Since 2022, Washington has taken a series of measures targeting the backbone of the Russian economy: restricting access to financial markets, targeting tankers and oil service companies, and imposing export restrictions on advanced technology. In 2025, this trend escalated; On the energy front, in January, the US Treasury Department issued additional target lists against Russian oil companies and tankers. In the summer, Washington also sought to tighten mechanisms for imposing price caps and monitoring transactions related to oil exports to Asian markets. These tools are now straining Moscow's ability to secure traditional financing for logistics and export services, exacerbating Russian companies' difficulties accessing Western capital markets.

2. Energy: Expanding its Network of Dependence on Beijing

In response to financial isolation and pressure on energy exports, Moscow has focused on expanding its Asian markets, primarily China. During the summer of 2025, concrete economic steps were announced, including agreements and memoranda of understanding to build new "Power of Siberia-2" pipeline projects and expanding long-term supply contracts that guarantee gas and oil flows at preferential prices and operational details for Beijing. Recent weeks have also seen financial arrangements allowing Russian companies to issue renminbi-denominated bonds (steps to reopen the Chinese bond market to Russian companies), reflecting Beijing's desire to provide a partial financial haven for Moscow's institutions. These agreements mitigate the impact of Western restrictions on Russian energy revenues and give the Kremlin time and financial space to deal with sanctions pressure. Linking energy supplies to financial ties also opens a window to reduce Russia's exposure to the dollar and Western banking systems, but it does not eliminate long-term financing challenges.

3. Financing and Monetary Integration: Tools to Bypass the Blockade

Financial convergence has emerged in practical indicators: initiatives to issue Russian "Panda" bonds in China, the development of local currency settlement mechanisms, and Russian proposals within forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to promote an alternative payment and investment architecture. In addition, Putin and others proposed ideas at the 2025 summits for joint mechanisms (joint bonds, regional financing banks) to reduce reliance on Western payment systems. Such steps could enable Moscow to access new liquidity, but they face constraints. Chinese banks have warned of potential secondary sanctions, the need for complex legal structuring, and real liquidity constraints in exchange for floating financing. International financial reports have also noted that Beijing is moving to facilitate a limited issuance of Russian bonds, but it remains cautious due to the risks of sanctions.

4. The Military Dimension: Joint Exercises and Increased Security Coordination

At the military level, the practical patterns of Russian-Chinese cooperation were strengthened in 2025 through joint naval and air exercises (such as the Sea-2025 and Vostok/June exercises), and exercises held off the coasts of the Russian Far East and in the seas adjacent to the Sea of ​​Japan and the East China Sea. These exercises were not simply a show of force; they focused on logistical coordination, naval intelligence exchange, and the development of joint surveillance and deterrence capabilities. The presence of extensive Chinese participation in exercises such as Vostok/Sea reflects the fact that security cooperation has moved beyond symbolic understandings to operational mechanisms.

5. The Political and Diplomatic Dimension:

Politically, regional summits such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit (Tianjin 2025) provided Moscow with an expanded platform to present a multipolar option and demonstrate that "Western isolation" is not an unavoidable political force. Joint statements by leaders in Beijing and Moscow focused on rejecting what they described as hegemony and a unilateral structure, and both sides called for alternative institutions (financing bodies, SCO/BriSS+ investment mechanisms) to bolster alternative legitimacy. Putin proposed joint ideas for SCO bonds and payment mechanisms, and such signals enable Russia to provide diplomatic cover for its rapprochement with Beijing and expand the scope of economic-political alliances.

6. Limits and Conditions of Russian Rapprochement with Beijing

Despite the strengthening of the partnership, Russian rapprochement remains limited by a number of structural obstacles:

• Technological Dependence: Russia lacks capabilities in the semiconductor and microprocessor technology chains, leaving it in a position of technological dependence on other parties—this creates partial dependence on Chinese technologies that may carry sovereign consequences.
• Economic Asymmetry: China's economic strength and diversity give Beijing the latitude to create its own conditions, while Russia may sometimes be forced to accept financing terms or energy prices that reduce the profitability of its exports.
• Fears of Unilateral Dependence: The Kremlin and segments of the Russian elite are aware of the risks of unilateral dependence on Beijing. Therefore, Russia seeks to maintain trade and political ties with other countries (for example, some Asian and African markets) to reduce the risk of economic "dependence”.

7. The impact of this rapprochement on Russia's ability to resist US pressure.

The practical result is that deepening the partnership with Beijing has given Moscow a greater capacity to absorb the shocks of sanctions: alternative energy markets, partial renminbi financing channels, and security coordination mitigate the impact of political isolation. However, this capacity is not absolute: long-term financing challenges, the need for advanced technological equipment, and the risk of secondary sanctions against Chinese partners reduce the flexibility of solutions. Therefore, Russia is pursuing a "damage containment" strategy through multiple tracks—strengthening ties with China while always seeking to maintain other international options and limit excessive exposure.

Fifth: Reshaping the International Balance and Systemic Consequences

The accumulation of confrontational US policies under the second Trump administration coincided with a pragmatic response from Beijing and adaptive maneuvers from major regional powers—producing a new dynamic capable of reshuffling centers of influence and global institutional mechanisms. What is striking is that the change here is not merely rapid and revolutionary, but rather gradual and interconnected: immediate US actions (tariffs, financial restrictions, energy pressures) have triggered practical responses (Russian-Chinese energy agreements, Indian diversification in infrastructure and technology, the expansion of the BRICS/new partner network), all of which have together redrawn the rules of engagement between economic and political power. In this section, we will delve into the mechanisms of transformation, the structural indicators, and the implications of this transformation for the institutions of the international system (finance, trade, security), concluding with valuable public policy recommendations for decision-makers and research institutions.

1. Structural Indicators of Rebalancing:

Indicators of the trend toward China can be traced according to the following counterintuitive indicators:

• A shift in countries' expectations of the United States as a reliable partner: Measures such as raising tariffs of up to 50% on Indian imports in August 2025 are among the most striking examples of Washington's use of punitive economic tools, even against long-standing allies and partners—a move that demonstrated the ability of US domestic policies to reshape the external incentives of partners like New Delhi.
• A shift in global energy and financial trends: The expansion of agreements between Moscow and Beijing (including promoting pathways for increased gas exports through projects such as Power of Siberia-2) has given Russia a practical reprieve from the pressure of Western sanctions, while simultaneously providing Beijing with commercial and strategic leverage by securing long-term supplies. However, this transformation remains unbalanced—it reduces Russia's exposure to the dollar in some transactions and expands the role of the renminbi, but it does not transform the international system into an alternative network capable of completely replacing the existing financial system in a short period of time.
• Partial institutional development: Expanding cooperation mechanisms within frameworks such as BRICS and regional financial institutions aims to create spaces for settling transactions in local currencies and issuing local debt instruments. However, these paths face liquidity constraints and limited international acceptance in the near term, making their impact gradual and slow, rather than immediate. Reports from international think tanks and analysts indicate that BRICS expansion in 2025 is symbolically and strategically significant, but it faces leadership and liquidity challenges.
• Changing pattern of security arrangements: Growing Russian-Chinese maneuvers and intensified coordination of naval capabilities in axes opposing Western interests and with India in the Indian Ocean indicate a directional shift in the regional deterrence architecture. This development does not amount to a transformation into a binding defense alliance similar to the post-World War II axes, but it raises the cost of unilateral reliance on a single partner and reinforces the logic of "flexible multilateralism" in regional security options.

2. Impact on the International Financial and Trade System

• Weakening the Dollar's Centrality: Shifts in the settlement of energy transactions in renminbi and the issuance of local bonds (such as Russia's Panda Bonds) signal the beginning of a regional process of reducing dependence on the dollar. However, this process requires liquidity structures, an alternative capital market, and long-term institutional confidence—factors that cannot be built overnight. Therefore, the expected medium-term outcome is not the replacement of the dollar, but rather a relative reduction in its share in some regional transactions, while its dominance in major international transactions continues.
• Disruption of Value Chains and Regionalization: High US tariffs on imports from certain countries are pushing companies to reconsider their supply chains, reinforcing regionalization trends and reducing complexity through shorter trade routes. This trend may raise trade costs in the short term and create new regional competition, but it also reduces the flexibility of global trade and reinforces a trend toward differentiated regional systems. Market reports confirm the impact of the 2025 tariffs on sensitive Indian exports (jewelry, textiles, and agricultural products).

3. Implications for Regional Security and Deterrence

With the emergence of Russian-Chinese maneuvers and India's expansion of its naval capabilities, the balance of power in the maritime spaces of Asia may shift—not necessarily through a sudden change in military ownership, but rather through each side's increased ability to respond and move beyond its traditional bases. This creates an environment where "flexible alliances"—or issue-based partnerships—become a guaranteed alternative to fixed alliances, posing challenges in risk management and inter-force communication (warnings, contingency lines, and the organization of maritime agreements). Traditional deterrence tools are becoming more fragmented and ambiguous.

Sixth: Scenarios for the Development of the International System in the Medium Term

Scenario One: The Gradual Expansion of Multipolarity

The most likely scenario until 2030 appears to be the gradual expansion of multipolarity. The continuation of US policies based on economic, financial, and military pressure will encourage Beijing to build a broader network of trade, investment, and financial relations, and will push Moscow to strengthen its partnerships with countries in the South to secure alternative channels to Western markets and the sanctions imposed on them. This trend will lead to an international system with more diverse centers of power. However, it will necessarily be an inconsistent system, governed primarily by shifting regional balances, where flexibility and reliance on local interests prevail more than the solidity of major alliances. The expected outcome is the emergence of a strategic environment characterized by tense coexistence between competing major powers, where each power limits the influence of the other without the ability to formulate new, stable rules for the global order.

Scenario Two: A Mixed Multi-Currency System and Regional Settlements

In contrast, another, more likely scenario is the emergence of a mixed multi-currency system and regional settlements. With the expansion of local currency use in bilateral and multilateral transactions, especially in the energy and regional trade sectors, the relative share of the dollar in some economic sectors will gradually decline. This decline will not undermine its absolute dominance in global finance or major infrastructure. The dollar will retain its position as a major currency thanks to the depth of US liquidity markets and the close ties of international institutions. However, at the same time, countries will gain greater flexibility in managing the diversity of their financial instruments, creating a state of "monetary parallelism" that does not eliminate the centrality of the dollar, but rather weakens its monopoly. The result will be a more diverse global economic system in terms of settlement instruments, but one that remains captive to the structural differences between major financial markets and emerging alternatives.

Scenario Three: A Partial Freeze of Multilateral Cooperation

The third scenario, with a medium to high probability, concerns a partial freeze in multilateral cooperation. Given the ongoing legitimacy and representation crises within traditional institutions such as NATO, the G7, and the World Trade Organization, these frameworks will remain capable of functioning and influencing, but they will face mounting challenges in terms of effective mobilization and the ability to address transnational issues such as climate change, technological governance, and artificial intelligence. Without a revamped American toolkit for building trust and reshaping the rules of engagement, the ability of these institutions to monopolize legitimacy will erode, opening the way for the rise of alternative regional initiatives and the growing role of flexible frameworks led by other major powers. The result here is not the collapse of the multilateral system, but rather the entrenchment of a state of "effective stagnation," where work continues but with reduced efficiency and declining credibility.

• Scenario Four: Limited Regional Conflict as an Accelerator of Blocs

Finally, there is a relatively low-probability, but highly dangerous, scenario in terms of consequences: the outbreak of a limited regional clash between some rising powers, such as India and China, whether in the form of border clashes or naval confrontations. Such a development, if it occurs, would serve as a catalyst that would accelerate the drift of countries toward solid alliances or blocs, shrinking the space for active neutrality that regional powers have adopted in recent years. Although the likelihood of such a scenario remains moderate to low, given the cost of escalation for the parties involved, its occurrence could lead to widespread disruptions to global trade chains and have a direct impact on the stability of energy markets and regional security. This makes it a low-probability but high-cost scenario that merits close monitoring.

Conclusion

The United States' return, under Donald Trump, to its confrontational approach to managing international relations has not only created cracks in the structure of traditional alliances, but has also accelerated the redistribution of power within the international system. India has found itself in a difficult position between pressures from Washington and offers from Beijing, adopting a policy of "flexible balancing," allowing it to achieve technological, security, and economic gains without being beholden to any particular party. Conversely, US sanctions have pushed Russia further toward "embracing China," in a scene reminiscent of the Cold War, but with new economic and technological tools.

Furthermore, the convergence of Indian-Russian-Chinese paths does not necessarily mean building a solid alliance. Rather, it reflects complex interactions in which cooperation intersects with competition, creating complementary gaps and opportunities for other powers, such as Europe, the Middle East, and countries of the Global South. This dynamic essentially reflects the international system's transition to a state of "strategic fluidity," characterized by the decline of American hegemony on the one hand, and the rise of regional powers seeking to fill the gaps on the other. In conclusion, the significance of these transformations goes beyond bilateral relations or even regional blocs, indicating a reshaping of the international balance in a manner open to possibilities. The world is moving toward a more complex and multifaceted system of centers of influence, where unipolarity is no longer sustainable, while the form of future multilateralism remains unstable. This makes the next phase, until 2030, crucial in determining the nature of the global order: Will it crystallize toward a balanced multipolarity, or toward protracted conflicts that maintain a state of turmoil as the hallmark of the new phase?

 

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